UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-6-2007

McKay v. State Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 34271

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"McKay v. State Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 34271" (2007). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1925.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1925

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
SHANE MCKAY.
PetitionerAppellant,
Supreme Court No. 34271

1
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding

Molly Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703
Attorney for Appellant

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720
Attonley for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page no.

Vol. no.

Register of Actions

1

I

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Filed 1-19-07

2 -6

I

Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery, Filed 1-19-07

7 - 10

I

Petitioner's Request That the Court Take Judicial Notice, Filed 1-19-07

11- 12

I

Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Filed 1-22-07
Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Filed 1-29-07
Motion to Strike UPCRA Petition, Filed 1-29-07
Ex Parte Motion for Summary Dismissal Under I.C. 19-4906(b), Filed
1-29-07
Objection to Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery, Filed 1-29-07
Motion for Suinmary Disposition Under I.C. 19-4906(c), Filed 1-29-07
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Suimnary Disposition, Filed 2-1-07
Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and
In Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 3-26-07
Notice of Filing of Exhibits, Filed 3-28-07
Court Minutes-Motion Hearing, Held 5-21-07
Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Filed 6-1-07
Notice of Appeal, Filed 6-4-07
Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Foilna Pauperis and to Appoint State
Appellate Public Defender, Filed 6-4-07
Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition and
Denying Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition, Filed 6-5-07 293 - 294

TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued

Order Granting Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Foma Pauperis and to
Appoint State Appellate Public Defender, Filed 6-12-07

Page no.

Vol. no.

295 - 296

I1

299

I1

Certificate of Exhibit
Certificate of Clerk
Certificate of Service

INDEX
Page no.

Vol. no.

Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Filed 1-29-07

43 - 46

I

Certificate of Clerk

298

I1

Certificate of Exhibit

297

I1

Certificate of Service

299

I1

Court Minutes-Motion Hearing, Held 5-21-07

241 - 242

I1

Ex Parte Motion for Summary Dismissal Under LC. 19-4906(b), Filed
1-29-07

49 - 50

I

Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and
In Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 3-26-07

224 - 232

I1

Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Filed 1-22-07

13-42

I

Motion for Summary Disposition Under LC. 19-4906(c), Filed 1-29-07

137 - 221

I1

Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis and to Appoint State
Appellate Public Defender, Filed 6-4-07

286 - 292

I1

Motion to Strike UPCRA Petition, Filed 1-29-07

47 - 48

I

Notice of Appeal, Filed 6-4-07

283 - 285

I1

Notice of Filing of Exhibits, Filed 3-28-07

233 - 240

I1

Objection to Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery, Filed 1-29-07

51 - 136

I

Order Granting Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis and to
Appoint State Appellate Public Defender, Filed 6-12-07

295 - 296

I1

Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition and
Denying Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition, Filed 6-5-07 293 - 294

I1

222 - 223

I1

Petitioner's Cross-Motion for S m n ~ a r yDisposition, Filed 2-1-07

INDEX, Continued
Page no.

Vol. no

Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery, Filed 1-19-07

7-10

I

Petitioner's Motion fot Relief from Judgment, Filed 6-1-07

243 - 282

I1

Petitioner's Request That the Court Take Judicial Notice, Filed 1-19-07

11 - 12

I

Register of Actions

1

I

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Filed 1-19-07

2 -6

I

TP

Date: 711212007
Time: 10:08 AM
Page 1 of 1

-

ludicial District Court Canyon Count

User: RANDALL

ROA Report
Case: CV-2007-0000728-C Current Judge: Renae J. Hoff

Shane Edward Mckay, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Shane Edward Mckay, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date
111912007

Judge
New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief
Filing: 9SPC - Post Conviction Relief Filing Paid by: Dennis Benjamin
Receipt number: 0225281 Dated: 111912007 Amount: $.00 (Cash)
For Information Prior To This Date See Case File CR03-21789
Verified petition for post conviction relief
Petitioner's motion for permission to conduct discovery

112212007
1/29/2007

Petitioner's request that the court take judicial notice
Memorandum support of verified PCR
Objection -to
motion for mpermission to conduct discovery
Motion for summary disposition

2/1/2007
3/26/2007

Answer To Petition For Post Conviction Relief
Ex Parte Motion for Summary Dismissal Under I.C. 19-4906(b)
Motion To Strike UPCRA Petition
Petitioners Cross Motion for Summary Disposition
Notice Of Hearing/Summaryjmt

3/28/2007

Memorandum in response to state's motn for summary disp /support
cross-motn for summary jmt
Affidavit in support memorandum resp state's motnlcross motn summary
Notice Of Hearing motn/strike/summary dispo

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/24/2007 11:OO AM) To StrikeIFor Renae J. Hoff
Summary Dispo
Notice of filing of exhibits
4/24/2007
4/26/2007
5/21/2007

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/24/2007 11:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated To StrikeIFor Summary Dispo- to be reset by Secretary
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/21/2007 03:30 PM)
Renae J. Hoff
Amended Notice Of Hearing 05/21/2007
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/21/2007 03:30 PM:
Disposition With Hearing- Petion for PCR denied-State's motion for
summary dismissal granted

6/1/2007

Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action
Petitioner's Motion for relief from Judgment

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

6/4/2007

Notice of Appeal

Renae J. Hoff

Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis and to Appoint State
Appellate Pubiic Def.
Appealed To The Supreme Court

Renae J. Hoff

6/5/2007
611212007

Order granting respondent's motion for summary disposition and denying
petitioner's cross-motion for summary disposition
Order Granting Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis and to
Appoint State Appellate Public Defender

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (f)

JAN 1 9 2007
CANYON

T

WHIT^)

UNTY CLERK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
)

Petitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

WL? b

c

1
1

CASE NO.

)
)
)

VEFUFIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

1
)

1. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
1. Petitioner, Shane McKay, is currently incarcerated at the Saint Anthony Work Center in Saint
Anthony, Idaho.
2. Mr. McKay is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
State of Idaho, County of Canyon, the Honorable Renae J. Hoff, presiding.
3. The Canyon County District Court Number for that case is CR-2003-21789*C.
4. Mr. McKay was charged with one count of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter.

5. Following a jury trial, Mr. McKay was found guilty of the vehicular manslaughter charge.
6. Mr. McKay was represented in the District Court by attorney Richard L. Harris.
1
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7. The District Court sentenced Mr. McKay to a unified term of ten years with a minimum

period of confinement of four years.
8. Mr. McKay filed a Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction in his sentence, which the
District Court denied.

9. Mr. McKay appealed from the sentence and the District Court's denial of his Rule 35 motion.
10. Attorney Jason C. Pintler represented Mr. McKay on appeal.
11. On November 22,2006, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and the District
Court's denial of the Rule 35 motion.
12. A petition for review filed by Mr. McKay is pending before the Idaho Supreme Court.
13. With respect to this conviction, Mr. McKay has not filed any other petitions for postconviction relief.

11. FIRST CAUSE O F ACTION: Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Trial
14. The state alleged that Mr. McKay committed vehicular manslaughter because he killed Ted
Cox by operating a motor vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol
concentration in excess of 0.08.
15. Mr. Hams requested a jury instruction, which provided that Mr. McKay was guilty of
vehicular manslaughter if he unlawfully drove a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the
unlawful operation of the vehicle caused the death of Mr. Cox.
16. The district court instructed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty of vehicular manslaughter if
he was driving while under the influence of alcohol, or while having an alcohol concentration in excess
of 0.08; and the his operation of the vehicle caused the death of Mr. Cox.

2
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17. At a jury instruction conference, Mr. Harris informed the district court that he was not
requesting a jury instruction on the element of cause.
18. The jury found Mr. McKay guilty.

111. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel on Appeal

19. That a Notice of Appeal from the District Court sentence was filed.
20. That the State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Mr. McKay.
21. On September 20,2006, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender Jason C. Pintler filed the
appellant's brief, in which he argued that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence and denying Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion for reduction in the sentence.
22. Attorney Pintler did not raise any other issues on direct appeal.
23. On November 22,2006, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opinion affirming Mr.
McKay's sentence and the District Court's denial of the Rule 35 motion.
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief:
A. That the conviction be vacated.
B. That the judgment be withdrawn and then reentered so that Petitioner will have 42 days in
which to file a new notice of appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

f fi iday of January, 2007
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney fo; Shane McKay
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40000104

VERIFICATION OF PETITION
I, Shane McKay, being duly sworn under oath, state:

1. I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and that the
matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this&
the foregoing document to be:

cfi

day of January, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of

(Cmailed
faxed
hand delivered
to:

Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany
Caldwell, ID 83605

Dennis Benjamin
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4 199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN McKAY& BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 ( f )
Attorneys for the Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
NO.

W04- ~HCI

Petitioner,
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
Petitioner, Shane McKay, asks this Court for its Order granting permission for him to
conduct discovery. As explained below, discovery is appropriate in this case because it is
necessary to protect the "substantive rights" of petitioner. See Grgfith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,
375,825 P.2d 94,98 (Ct. App. 1992). While discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings
is a matter put to the sound discretion of the District Court, it would be an abuse of discretion to
deny discovery where the petitioner has identified the type of information that he or she may
obtain through discovery and explained how that information could affect the disposition of his
or her application for post-conviction relief. Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 3 11 , 319,912 P.2d
679,687 (Ct. App.1996).
1

. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY

In this case, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during
trial and on direct appeal. Therefore, evidence regarding the reasons underlying counsels'
performance is necessary to develop Petitioner's claims
In particular, Petitioner seeks to take the deposition of Attorneys Richard Harris and
Justin Curtis to determine the following:

1. Was Attorney Harris aware that the jury instructions given by the District
Court were inconsistent with the approved pattern Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions?
2. Had Attorney Harris reviewed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. McNair,
141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct. App. 2005)?
3. What reasons did Attorney Harris have for acquiescing to jury instructions that
omitted the elements of cause and intent?

4. What reasons did Attorney Pintler have for failing to raise the erroneous jury
instructions as an issue on direct appeal
5. What reasons did Attorney Pintler have for challenging only the length of
Petitioner's sentence?
The answers to these questions are all relevant to Petitioner's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel against Attorneys Harris and Pintler. Mr. McKay claims Attorney Harris's
performance fell below reasonable professional standards because he acquiesced to jury
instructions that omitted elements of the charged offense. Mr. McKay claims Attorney Pintler's
performance fell below reasonable professional standards because he failed to raise the erroneous
jury instructions as an issue on direct appeal. The reasons why these facts are central to
Petitioner's claims are set out in the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief contemporaneously filed.

2

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY

As shown above, discovery is needed to protect Mr. McKay's substantial rights and the
motion for permission to conduct discovery should be granted.

1
P

Respectfully submitted this - day of January 2007.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Petitioner

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on .January
document to be:

/ 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

F-hand delivered

-faxed
to:

Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany
Caldweli. ID 83605

Dennis Benjamin
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4 199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1 000

PM

Ril

JAid 1 9 2007

1
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
'B $ibwi C

DEPUTY

Attorneys for the Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,

cv03-3&$c2

Petitioner,
)

vs.

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

1

No.
PETITIONER'S REQUEST
THAT THE COURT TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE

)
)

1

Respondent.

Shane McKay asks this Court, pursuant to DRE 201(d), to take judicial notice of the
following adjudicative facts:
1 The files and records in the case of State v. Shane McKay, No. CR-03-2 1789*C.
2. The file, record, transcripts and exhibits in State v. Shane McKay, Idaho Supreme

*

Court Docket No. 31652.
Dated this

day of January 2007.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Petitioner

1. PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on January
document to be

A

2007, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

mailed

-hand deIivered
-faxed
to:

Canyon County Prosecutor
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Di) 83605

Dennis Benjamin
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (f)
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,

1
Petitioner,

)

1
VS.

)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

1
1

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

)

Petitioner Shane McKay was charged with felony vehicular manslaughter, LC.

5 18-

4006(3)(b). Following a jury trial during which Richard L. Harris represented Mr. McKay, the
jury found Mr. McKay guilty of felony vehicular manslaughter. This Court sentenced Mr.
McKay to a unified term of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of four years. Mr.
McKay filed an LC.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which this Court denied.
Mr. McKay appealed from the sentence and this Court's denial of his Rule 35 motion.
Jason C. Pintler, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, was appointed to represent Mr.
McKay. Attomey Pintler filed a brief arguing that this Court abused its discretion by imposing
1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

an excessive sentence and by denying Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion. In an unpublished opinion,
the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. McKay's sentence and the denial of the Rule 35 motion.
See State v. McKay, Docket No. 3 1652 (Ct. App. Nov. 22,2006).

Mr. McKay has filed the instant action asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction
relief. Specifically, for the reasons set forth below, Mr. McKay contends that neither Attorney
Harris nor Attorney Pintler provided effective assistance of counsel.
A. Mr. McKay did not Receive the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 , s
13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal case the effective assistance of
counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal
constitution, is analyzed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Pursuant to Strickland, a petitioner will prevail when he proves: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance,
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. St~icklarzd,466 U.S. at 689.
A defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious
advocate. W m k v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 157, 857 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 1993). Therefore,
counsel performs deficiently when his performance falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277,971 P.2d 727,730 (1998); Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner meets the prejudice prong

by showing there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in
the case if the attorney had acted properly. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
2
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In this case, Attorney Richard Hams performed deficiently because he failed to object to
jury instructions that omitted the element of cause and allowed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty
of a strict liability offense. Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Harris's deficient
performance because, had the jury been properly instructed, there is a reasonable probability that
the jury would have acquitted Mr. McKay. Accordingly, this Court should grant Mr. McKay's
Petition for Post-conviction Relief.
1. Defense Counsel's Performance Was Deficient Because He Failed to Obiect to
Clearlv Erroneous Jurv Instructions.
Attorney Hams's performance fell below objective standards of competence because
neither the jury instruction he requested nor the instruction given by the District Court required
the jury to conclude that the death resulted from Mr. McKay's culpable conduct. A jury
instruction that lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by omitting an element of the crime
violates a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000); see also State v.
Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663,666,84 P.3d 599,602 (Ct. App. 2004). The failure to permit the jury

to determine whether the state had proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
also violated Mr. McKay's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Neder v. United States, 527

U.S. 1 (1999). Accordingly, Attorney Harris's acquiescence to jury instructions, which removed
essential elements of the crime charged from the jury's consideration, constituted deficient
performance. See also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54,58,921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 1996).

3
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a. Thejury was allowed tofind Mr. McKay guilty of a strict liability offense.
Idaho law requires a mental state of at least simple negligence before an individual may
be convicted of vehicular manslaughter. State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263,267, 108 P.3d 410,414
(Ct. App. 2005). In McNair, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the crime of vehicular
manslaughter may be a strict liability offense. McNair, 141 Idaho at 265, 108 P.3d at 412. In
determining that misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter requires negligent conduct, the Court
noted that the legislature had enacted LC. 5 18-4012, which defines when homicide is excusable,
and I.C. § 18-201(3), which defines persons capable of committing crimes. By enacting those
statutes, the legislature expressed its intent that a death occurring by accident and without
negligence or other culpable behavior is not a criminal homicide. McNair, 141 Idaho at 267, 108
P.3d at 414.
The jury in McNair was instructed to find the defendant guilty if it concluded that, while
operating a motor vehicle, he failed to maintain a lane of travel and that his operation of the
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused a death. Because the jury was instructed to find the
defendant guilty based solely on his failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if such failure was
not a product of negligence or other culpable conduct, the Court concluded the jury instruction
was erroneous. McNair, 141 Idaho at 269, 108 P.3d at 416.
Similarly, both the jury instruction requested by Attorney Harris and the one given by the
District Court allowed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty based solely on the concIusion he
committed the offense of driving under the influence (DUI) and his operation of the vehicle
caused a death. A person commits a DUI by driving while under the influence of alcohol or
4
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drugs or by having a breath or blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08, regardless of
whether the person knew or should have known that he or she was impaired or had a sufficiently
elevated blood alcohol concentration. See LC. 5 18-8004. Thus, like the failure to maintain a
lane of travel, the offense of DUI does not require that the proscribed conduct be committed with
culpable intent.
Therefore, contrary to the Court of Appeals holding in McNair that vehicular
manslaughter cannot be a strict liability offense, the jury instructions in this case allowed the jury
to find Mr. McKay guilty regardless of whether the jury found that the accident was the result of
his culpable conduct. It was objectively unreasonable for Mr. Hams to acquiesce to jury
instructions that omitted the element of intent from the charged offense and created a strict
liability offense.
b. Thejury was not instructed regarding the element ofcause.
The state was required to prove not only that Mr. McKay committed a DUI and there was
an accident resulting in death, but also that Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI was the cause of
the accident resulting in death. See State v. Thomas, 128 Idaho 906,908,920 P.2d 927,929 (Ct.
App. 1996). Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 709 clarifies this concept by indicating that "the
defendant's operation of the vehicle in such unlawful manner was a significant cause
contributing to the death." (Emphasis added.) Because the Idaho Supreme Court approved the
pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, they are presumptively correct. State v. Hopper, 142
Idaho 512,514, 129 P.3d 1261,1263 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho
373,376, 93 P.3d 704,707 (Ct. App. 2004).
5
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Here, the jury instructions deviated from the pattern instructions, omitted the phrase "in
such unlawful manner" and, thus, failed to connect Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI with the
death. Instead, the jury was permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty regardless of whether the jury
concluded that the fact Mr. McKay committed a DUI had anything to do with the accident.
Moreover, Idaho law provides that a person commits behicular manslaughter only when
the unlawful operation of the vehicle was a signzjicant cause of the death. LC. 5 18-4006(3);
ICJI 709. Neither Mr. McKay's requested jury instruction nor the district court's instruction
informed the jury that, in order to commit vehicular manslaughter, the state must prove that the
operation of the vehicle in an unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to a death.
The concept of "significant cause" embodies the rule that to constitute vehicular homicide
there must be a causal connection between the death and the defendant's driving so that the act
was a proximate cause of the resulting death. See Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions Crim 90.07;
Miller v. State, 513 S.E. 2d 27,30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). The tern "proximate cause" means a

cause which, in direct sequence unbroken by any new independent cause, produces the death and
without which the death would not have happened. Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions Crim 90.07.
Thus, even though contributory negligence is not a defense to vehicular manslaughter, an
intoxicated defendant can avoid responsibility for a death resulting from the defendant's driving
if the death was caused by a superseding event. State v. Souther, 998 P.2d 350,355 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000).

By failing to inform the jury that Mr. McKay was guilty of vehicular manslaughter only if
his commission of a DUI was a signz3cant cause of the accident resulting in death, the jury was

6
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permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty even if the death would have occurred notwithstanding Mr.
McKay's culpable conduct. Thus, the jury instructions in this case impermissibly lightened the
state's burden of proof.
Attorney Hams acknowledged that the element of cause was a significant issue.
Inexplicably, Attorney Hams nonetheless informed the District Court that he did not intend to
request that the jury be instructed regarding the element of cause. Thus, the jury was simply
instructed that Mr. McKay was guilty if his operation of the vehicle caused the death. Attorney
Harris failed to perform in an objectively reasonable manner by acquiescing to jury instructions
that omitted the element of cause from the charged offense.
c. Conclusion
The jury instructions given in this case described a strict liability offense and relieved the
state of its burden to prove that a death resulted from Mr. McKay's culpable conduct. Moreover,
the instructions failed to describe the cause element by informing the jury that to be guilty of
vehicular manslaughter, the fact that Mr. McKay was driving under the influence caused the
accident resulting in death.
Attorney Harris's decision to not challengejury instructions that omitted elements of the
offense carnot be attributed to a strategic decision and must have been based on ignorance of the
law or other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. Therefore, Attorney Harris's
performance in failing to object to these clearly erroneousjury instructions fell beneath objective
standards of competence.

7
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2. Mr. McKav Was Preiudiced bv Defense Counsel's Performance Because, Had the Jury
Been ProperlvInstructed, There Is a Reasonable Probabilitv Mr. McKav Would Have
Been Acauitted.
Mr. McKay was prejudiced by the jury instruction, which omitted elements of the offense
unless the guilty verdict "was surely unattributable to the error." See State v. Thompson, 143
Idaho 155, 158, 139 P.3d 757, 760 (Ct. App. 2006), citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
279 (1993). A defendant is prejudiced when a jury is not instructed as to an element of an
offense and the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in favor of the
defendant with respect to the omitted element. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999);
Thompson, 143 Idaho at 158, 139 P.3d at 760. Therefore, a defendant meets the prejudice prong
when an essential element of the offense is at issue and counsel performs deficiently by
acquiescing to an instruction that removes that element from the jury's consideration. Gittins,
129 Idaho at 58,921 P.2d at 758.
Additionally, Attorney Harris's deficient performance in acquiescing to the erroneous
jury instructions deprived Mr. McKay of the opportunity to have those instructions reviewed on
direct appeal. See State v. Anderson, -Idaho

-,

-P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2006), 2006 WL

2974049. Mr. Harris's failure to object to the clearly erroneous jury instruction constituted
deficient performance. See Anderson, Docket 2006 WL 2974049, at n.3. Mr. McKay was
prejudiced by this deficient performance. Had Mr. Harris made a proper objection to the jury
instructions, the Court would have either: 1) given the correct instructions, and Mr. McKay
would have been acquitted; or 2) the jury instruction issue would have been raised in Mr.
McKay's direct appeal, and Mr. McKay would have been granted a new trial by the Court of
8.
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Appeals.

B. Alternatively, Mr. McKay did not Receive the Effective Assistance of Counsel on
Appeal.
Mr. McKay acknowledges that any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal,
but was not, may not be raised in a post-conviction petition. LC. § 19-490I(b). If this Court
were to find that the jury instruction errors set forth above could have been raised on direct
appeal, notwithstanding the rule in State v. Anderson, supra, then the failure to raise those claims
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. (The Idaho Supreme Court has accepted
review of the Court of Appeals's opinion in Anderson and, as will be explained below, there are
strong reasons why the Court of Appeals opinion should be overruled.)
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to effective assistance of counsel on his or her first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387 (1985); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). The
Strickland test generally applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Roe
v. Flores-Orlega, 528 U.S. 470,476-77 (2000).

In order to perform in an objectively reasonable manner, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be
made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280,285,32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v. State,
130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App. 1997). The prejudice prong is met when the
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the appeal would have been different. Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277,971 P.2d at 730.

9
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As discussed in Section A above, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by jury instructions, which
defined a strict liability offense and omitted the element of cause. Attorney Pintler nevertheless
failed to raise the erroneous jury instructions as an issue on direct appeal. Moreover, because the
issue was meritorious, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Pintler's deficient performance.
As a general matter, courts will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and
tactical choices. State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546,551,21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). However, this
rule does not apply to counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance
of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id.
Rather than arguing that the District Court erred by misinstructing the jury, which was the
best argument to be made, Attorney Pintler argued that the District Court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction in sentence. In
order to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, and thus an abuse of the court's
discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66,70, 106
P.3d 392,396 (2005). Such challenges are rarely successful. See Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 71,
106 P.3d at 397; State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616,619 (2004); State v. Jeppesen,
138 Idaho 71, 76,57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462, 50 P.3d 472,477
(2002); State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 897, 980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999).
Experienced counsel frequently winnow out weaker arguments on appeal for the sake of
focusing on key issues. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 75 1-52. However, this principle is inapplicable in
cases such as the instant one, where the only issue raised on appeal was whether the District
10
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Court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. Therefore, there could be no
strategic or tactical reason to forego challenging the erroneous jury instructions for the sake of
focusing the Court's attention on the sentencing challenge. By failing to file a brief in support of
the best argument to be made, Attorney Pintler performed in an objectively unreasonable manner.
Even though Attorney Harris failed to preserve the jury instruction error by objecting in
the District Court, this error would have been reviewable under the doctrine of fundamental
error. "Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a
defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which
was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived."

Statev. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616,623,130 P.3d 1154,1161 (Ct. App. 2005).
The requirement that the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. In re Winship, supra; Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,277-78 (1993); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260
(Ct. App. 2000). Jury instructions that omit an element of the crime violate this guarantee by
lightening the prosecution's burden of proof. Crowe, 135 Idaho at 47, 13 P.3d at 1260; see also

State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 186 (Wash. 2001) (instructions allowing conviction without finding
an essential element of the crime charged relieves state of its burden to prove all elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, and thus, the error implicates the constitutional right to a fair trial).
Accordingly, the failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is
fundamental error, which is reviewable on appeal notwithstanding the absence of an objection in
the trial court. State v. Osborne, 808 P.2d 624,631-32 (N.M. 1991); Gabbert v. State, 141 P.3d
1l
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690,695 (Wyo. 2006). The omission ofjury instructions defining the elements of intent and
cause therefore constituted fundamental error that would have been reviewable for the first time
on appeal.
Moreover, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Pintler's failure to raise the erroneous
jury instruction on direct appeal. As discussed above in Section A, Mr. McKay was prejudiced
by thc omission of instructions describing the essential elements of the charged offense. Because
the District Court deviated from the jury instructions previously approved by the Idaho Supreme
Court, there was considerable risk that the verdict finding Mr. McKay guilty would have been
overturned on appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,647,962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998).
The failure to instruct the jury on all the elements of a criminal offense also violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Neder, supra. Accordingly, there is a
reasonable probability that, had the jury instruction issue been raised, the result of Mr. McKay's
direct appeal would have been different.
Mr. McKay acknowledges that in State v,Anderson, -Idaho

-9

-P.3d

(Ct.

App. 2006), 2006 WL 2974049, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a claim of fundamental
error concerning jury instructions may not be raised for the first time on appeal because it would
render the relevant provisions of I.C.R. 30 (b) "a nullity." 2006 WL 2974049*4. (Rule 30 (b), as
amended effective July of 2004, provides in part that "No party may assign as error the giving of
or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires or considers
its verdict.")
However, Anderson was decided on October 19,2006. Because Attorney Pintler filed his
12
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opening brief on September 20,2006, Anderson does not provide a basis for his failure to raise
the jury instruction error as an issue on appeal. At the time the opening brief was filed in Mr.
McKay's appeal, the jury instruction issue could have been raised for the first time on appeal
under the fundamental error doctrine.
Moreover, Mr. Anderson's petition for review was granted by the Supreme Court on
January 18,2007. Mr. McKay believes that Anderson was wrongly decided and that the decision
of the Court of Appeals will be overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court because the Court of
Appeals has misinterpreted I.C.R. 30(b).
There is no support for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that, by subjecting jury
instruction claims to the general rule that objections must first be made in the trial court, the
amendment to I.C.R. 30 was intended to exempt such claims from the exception of fundamental
error. Indeed, there is evidence supporting the contrary conclusion. Attached as Exhibit A to
this Memorandum is a copy of the Minutes of the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee meeting
held on November 21,2003. During this meeting, the amendment to I.C.R. 30(b) was discussed.
The discussion concerning the proposed rule change to LC.R. 30 (b) is set forth at pages six and
seven of the exhibit.
According to the Committee Minutes, Michael Henderson, then a Deputy Attorney
General and now Legal Counsel to the Supreme Court, submitted a letter to the Committee
setting out the arguments in support of the rule change. On page seven of that letter, in the first
full paragraph, Mr. Henderson noted that "[elven if there is no objection, fundamental error
arguments would still be preserved." Id. Thus, the Committee Minutes show that while the rule
13
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change was believed to be necessary to eliminate unobjected-to trial error from being raised on
appeal, the rule was not intended to eliminate fundamental error claims.
This conclusion is confirmed by a follow-up letter from Mr. Henderson to the Supreme
Court. After the November 21, 2003, meeting, Mr. Henderson followed up with a letter to
Justice Burdick, the Chairman of the Criminal Rules Committee. This letter restated and
expanded the arguments Mr. Henderson had previously made in support of the proposed
amendment to I.C.R. 30. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit B. In the middle of the first
full paragraph on page 2, Mr. Henderson states that:
Some courts hold that all objections to jury instmctions not raised to the trial court
are waived. Most courts hold that, in the absence of a trial objection to jury
instmctions, the appellate court will review only for clear or fundamental error, or
will otherwise require an elevated appellate standard. This Iatter mfe is the one
that would be consistent with Idaho's approach to the preservation of issues for
appeal, and is the one that should be adopted.
Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Henderson, in other words, urged rejection of the mle adopted by the
Anderson Court and urged the Court to continue to permit fundamental error to be raised for the

first time on appeal.
The long-standing rule in Idaho was, until Anderson, that fundamental error in instructing
the jury could be raised for the first time on appeal. In State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,486 P.2d
260 (1971), for example, the Defendant was questioned at trial about his failure to disclose his
alibi defense at the preliminary hearing. No objection to this questioning was made during the
trial. The Court of Appeals held that even though no objection was made at trial, "In the case of
fundamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may consider the same even though no
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objection had been made at the time of trial." 91 Idaho at 251,486 P.2d at 262; see also, State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,62-63,90 P. 3d 278 (2003); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,277,77
P.3d 956,966 (2003); State v. Headley, 130 Idaho 339,340-341,941 P. 3d 31 1,312-13 (1997);
State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54,60-61, 896 P. 2d 962,968-69 (1995); State v. L a y , 121 Idaho
842,843-844,828 P. 2d 871,872-73 (1992).
The Court of Appeals therefore erred by deyacto overruling these Supreme Court
decisions even though it believed I.C.R. 30(b) compelled that result. See State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3,20 (1997) ("The Court of Appeals was correct in applying thle principle of stare
decisis] despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule
one of its precedents.")
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has also held that fundamental error may be reviewed by
the court on appeal even though an appropriate objection was not made at trial. See e.g., State v.
Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho
663,84 P.3d 599 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624,67 P.3d 103 (Ct. App. 2003);
State v. Hollon; 126 Idaho 499,36 P.3d 1287 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,3
P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000).
Finally, the fundamental error doctrine is also entirely consistent with the trial court's
statuto~yresponsibility to instruct a jury as to all matters of law necessary for their information
imposed by LC. $ 19-2132. Thus, it is the duty of the court, not the defendant, to instruct the
jury on the essential elements of a crime. See Osborne, 808 P.2d at 631-32. The orderly and
equitable administration ofjustice requires that appellatecourts correct fundamental error
15
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notwithstanding the defendant's failure to object to the error. Id. Accordingly, if an objection is
required before the trial court's statutory duty pursuant to I.C.

5 19-2132 may be enforced in the

appellate courts, then it is this statute that has been rendered a nullity by the Anderson decision.
For these reasons, Mr. McKay asserts that Anderson was wrongly decided and will be reversed
by the Supreme Court.
Attorney Jason Pintler performed deficiently by failing to raise the erroneous jury
instruction as an issue on direct appeal. Mr. McKay was prejudiced by this performance because
there is a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on appeal had the issue been raised.
C . Conclusion.

The Court should grant the petition and:
1. Vacate Mr. McKay's judgment of conviction and sentence;
2. In the alternative, enter an amended judgment of conviction, which would allow Mr.

McKay to file a new direct appeal with the effective assistance of counsel.

3. Grant such other relief as the Court may find just in the circumstances.
Respectfully submitted this -day of January 2007.

Attorney fo; Shane ~
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CR,TMINAL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 21,2003, MEETING
Present: Justice Roger Burdick, Chair; Michael Henderson, Grant Loebs, Scott Axline,
Gar Hackney, Denise Rosen, Art Bistline, Amil Myshin, Judge Ron Wilper, Judge
Stephen Calhoun, Penny Friedlander, Molly Husky, Bill Douglas, Ann Mane Kelso, and
Cathy Derden.

I.C.R. 33.1 on Death Penaitv Procedures.
Due to the new statutory provisions on sentencing by a jury in death penalty cases, some
revisions were needed to these two mles. The changes that are recommended to I.C.R.
33.1 are as follows:
Amend the title ofRule 33.1 to make it clear it only addresses the situation where a jury
is waived at sentencing and the court has to make the findings.
Strike section (a) of the current mle 33.1 since the statute now provides that no PSI is
requested for these special sentencing proceedings. If a speciaI sentencing proceeding is
not held or one is held but no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt then the court may ordera PSI.
Update citations to the statute and fill in the former blanks in the rule that were for the
offense so that the only offense referred to is murder in the first degree. The Committee
noted that the new statute on jury sentencing only addresses the crime of murder in the
first degree and that sentencing in kidnapping cases is still an issue but decided to
conform the rule to the statute, LC. 19-2515.
Change references to "hearing" to "special sentencing proceeding"
Make additional changes in the form for findings to include in the opening paragraph that
the jury has been waived. Strike the reference to "court appointed" counsel and just refer
to counsel. In the section on.the hewing strike the reference to "notice to counsel" and
change the language in the findings as to why the death penalty is imposed to reflect the
language in the statute about the penalty not being unjust.
The changes recommended are set out below:
RULE 33.1 PROCEDURE WHERE DEATH PENALTY I 5 AUTHORIZED AND JURY I S WAIVED
FOR SPECIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING

(g b) Findings of the Trial Court in Capital Offenses. I n s ~ e c i asentenclnq
l
the trial court shall Hieft make written findings as required by section 19Idaho Code. The trial court shall serve copies of these written findings
upon the defendant or defendant's counsel and the prosecuting attorney,
(g e) Form of Findings, The Wrltten find~ngsof the trial court to be made after the
proceeding
special sentencing
shall be in substantially the Following form:

k&w

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO,

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

STATE OF IDAHO

)
I

)'
)

Plaintiff,
VS

.

,
Defendant.

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN
CONS,IDERING DEATH PENALTY
UNDER SECTION 19-2515,
IDAHO CODE.

The above defendant having (been found guilty by a jury) (entered a plea of gullti) of
the criminal offense of murder in the first dearee, which under the law authorizes the
imposition of the'death penalty*, the iurv havina been waived, and the court having
held a
sentencing !+sfkg proceedinq for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and
argument of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense;
NOW THEREFORE the court hereby makes the following Rndings:
I. Conviction. That the defendant while represented by -counsel
was
found guilty of the offense of murder in the first dearee (by jury verdict) (pursuant to
a plea of guilty).

2.3, Sentencing Hearing. That a sentencing hearing was held on
ReHfPand that a t said hearing, in the presence of the
1

defendant, the court'heard relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the
offense and arguments of counsel.
3 4. Facts and Arguments Found in Mitigation.
[Summarlze and Itemize]

4 6 . Facts and Arguments Found in Aggravation.
[Summarize and Iternlzel

7
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.

...
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,
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~

n d Section 19-2i15@
-5 6; statutory Aggravating ~ i r c u m s t ~ n c e i ~ o uUnder

aIdaho

Code.

[Describe in detail if a n y are found.]
7.

~ e a s o n sWhy Death Penalty Was Imposed.
.

.

[Set forth the finding and reasons why the court flnds no rnitioatina circumstances
wouid make the imoosition of the deatbenaitv uniust
OR

8.Reasons Why Death Penalty Was Not Imposed.
[Set forth finding why court finds the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the gravity of any
aggravating circumstances so as to make
unjust the imposition of the death penalty.]
CONCLUSION

That the death penalty (should) ('should not) be imposed on the defendant For the
capital offense of which he was convlcted.
DATED

/ s/

District ludge

Fax Filine of Sheriff s Certificates.
Judge Williamson, Administrative District Judge for the Fourth District, requested that
the Committee look at amending the rule on fax filings to address the potential for
fraud that cul~entlyexists by allowing the fax filing of sheriff's certificates or other
documents proving incarceration when exoneration of a bond is being sought. A
number of Committee members expressed consensus that court administrative offices
do in fact have concerns that these certificates are easy to alter and that alteration is
harder to detect when the document is faxed. The Committee recognized that
preventing fax filings of these documents will not necessarily deter some one from
filing a false document, but felt it would certainly make it harder.
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend that the second sentence of 1.C.R 49
(c) be amended as follows:
'(c) Filing. Documents required to be served shall be filed with the court. Documents
shall be filed in the manner provided in civil actions. Any document, except an
information or complaint, a search warrant, a warrant of arrest, or a return on a warrant or

.

.

service df a search warrant, or hvdocument filed as proof o~inearcerationof a aarty to
thd action, may be transmitted to the court for filing'by a facsimile machine process."
.

.

I.C.R. 4(e) and I.C.R. 41(c
The Committee was asked to look at the different language relating to affidavits for arrest
and affidavits for a search warrant as set out in I.C.R. 4(e) and I.C.R. 41(c), In the rule
on probable cause for an arrest it does not say the affidavit has to be sworn before the
judge or magistrate, but the rule on issuance of a search warrant requires the affidavit to
be sworn before the judge. After discussion there was a consensus that there was a
practical difference in the types of wmants and that there was no problenl that needed to
be addressed. No action was recommended.
No Contact Orders as Condition of Probation and Transmittal of Information to
Sheriffs
1.C. 6 18-922 is entitled "Order-Transmittal to Law Enforcement Agency" and specifies
that a no contact order issued as a cortdifion of bond is to be sent to the appropriate law
enforcement agency and entered into ILETS. Criminal Rule 46.2 addresses no contact
orders issued as a condition of release and directs that these orders are to be sent to the
sheriffs office and entered into ILETS in accord with I.C. 5 18-922.
The Conunittee was asked to consider no contact orders that are issued as a condition of
probation as compared to a condition of bond. When no contact is included as a
condition of probation the information is only included in the judgment sentencing the
defendant and placing him on probation. When these judgments are provided to the
sheriffs' offices they sometimes cause confusion because the no contact order is not on
the f o m ~ sthey are used to seeing. Thus, the no contact orders entered as a condition of
probation may not be getting entered in ILETS. The question considered was whether to
amend I.C.R. 46.2 to also provide that no contact orders issued as a coridition of
probation be sent to the sheriff for entry into ILETS.
In the discussion it was noted that Judge Michael Redman has been doing an extensive
study on no contact order procedures in Idaho and is making a number of
recommendations to the Court regarding no conlact orders. Thus, the Committee did not
want to make any recommendations that might conflict. The Committee did want to go
on record though as supporting the requirement that any no contact order issued as a
condition of probation also be sent to ILETS.
The Committee also voiced support for Judge Redman's recommendation that tio contact
orders have a time certain on them for expiration, and that any order dismissing or
modifying a no contact order be sent immediately to the sheriffs department for entry in
to LETS. A letter will be sent to Judge Redrnan expressing support for these
recommendations.
1.C.R 20 Transfer of cases
Judge Stegner submitted this agenda item after he had a case where a woman was
arrested in Latah County but lived in Kootenai County and wanted to have her case
transferred to Kootenai so she could participate in the dn~gcourt program there. The

,

.

.

,

lawyers involved brought .a motion to transfer under Rule .20, but. the current language
does not fit this situation, as it only refers to a transfer for a defendant arrested or held in
a county other than that in which the infomation.or indictment is pending and not to
someone residing in a county other than that in which the charge is pending. Judge
Stegner suggested that the rule be modified t o facilitate an inter-district transfer of a
district court case by including the word %rpresentfi, as is in the federalcounterpart to
this rule. Once someone is arrested and has bonded out he or she is going to be present in
the home county.
Several Committee members had experienced the same problenl and most were using the
changeof venue rule to get around it, but all agreed that modifying the rule would be
helpful and make it easier to transfer a case in order to allow someone to stay home and
take advantage of participating in a drug court progTam. It was recommended that the
words "or present" be added to the first line of the rule.
'

Ln addition, the Committee recommended that approval of the court in the county where
the action was pending be required in addition to the approval of the prosecutors that is
already required. There would be no way to get the approval of the court where the case
was being transferred as there would be no way of knowing which judge would have the
case.
Prosecutors on the Committee were concerned about having someone transferred to their
county in order to take advantage of drug court and then not qualifying for drug court.
All agreed that the approval ofthe prosecutor could be subject to conditions. The transfer
is based .in the defendant agreeing to plead guilty and the rule already provides that the
case will bereturned to the original county in the event a not guilty plea is entered. The
Committee recommended that language be added that. the case would also be sent back
upon failure to abide by conditions of transfer. By adding this language the prosecutors
may put conditions on the transfer such as eligibility for drug court.
The Ianguage in sections (a)(Z)and (a)3) was found to be repetitious and so it was
recommended that these subsections be deleted. It was also suggested that the title to
subsection (a)(l) be changed to reflect that it sets out the clerk's duties if the case is
transferred.
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend the rule be amended as follows:

Rule 20. Transfer from the county for plea and sentence.
(a) Complaint or indictment or information pending. A defendant arrested,~ h e l d ~ r
in a county other than that in which the complaint, information, or indictment is
pending against the defendant may state in writing that the defendant wishes to plead
guilty to the complaint, information, or indictment which is pending and to consent to
disposition of the case in the county in which the defendant was arrested,or is held&
subject to the approval of the transfer by the prosecuting attorney fiom each
county involved and the trial court where the case is amding.

m,

( H)-1erks'
duties. Upon receipt of the defendant's request
and consent and of the written approval of the prosecuting attorneys and the trial court
yhere the case is ending , the cierk of the court in which the complaint is pending shall
transfer the papers and the proceeding or certified copies thereof to the clerk of the court
for the county in which the defendant was arrested, or aAB is held or uresent; and the
prosecution shall continue in that county.

@ 8 ) Effect of not guilty plea or failure to abide by conditions of transfer.

If after the proceeding has been transfeced pursuant to subsection (a) of this rule the
defendant pleads not guilty or fails to abide by the conditions of transfer, if any, the clerk
shall return the papers to the court in which the prosecution was commenced and the
proceeding shall be restored to the docket of the court. The defendant's statement that the
defendant wished to plead guilty shall not be used against the defendant.
( d-e)
Summons. For the purpose of initiating a transfer under this mte a person who
appeared in response to the summons issued under Rule 4 shall be treated as if that
person had been arrested or held on a warrant in the county of such appearance.

It was hrther suggested that a uniform form for transfer be developed.

1.C.R 30&) and Obiections to JurvInstructions.
This rule addresses' jury instructions and the discussion centered around whether the
following sentence should be added: "No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the
grounds for objection." Prior to 1980 the rule stated that an objection was required but
the rule was amended in 1980 to delete this language and unfortunately there are no
committee minutes or record as to why this change was made. In 1990 the Idaho
Supreme Court held in State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225 (1990), that in view of the

e

ame~idnientthk failure to obiect to 'in instruction does not constitute a waiver of the issue
on appeal. In a recent case, State v. McLeskev, 138 Idaho 691,69 P.3d 11 1 (2003), the
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the rule and stated that in being asked to overrule Smith.
it was really being asked to amend the mle and noted lhat criminal rules should be
amended prospectively and not retroactively.
Justice Burdick noted that the agenda item came to the Committee &om the Court of
Appeals and not from the state. Michael Henderson submitted a letter to the Committee
setting out arguments supporting the change that included the fact that as it now stands,
the rule, which is interpreted not to require an objection, is contrary to the general rule
that our appellate courts will not consider issues presented for the first time on appeal;
that Idaho is the only jurisdiction that allows defendants to challenge instructions to
which there was no objection; that objections are still required as to an omitted
instruction; that invited error has beconle a confusing issue in these situations, and that
the rule allows defense counsel to purposely refrain from objecting to instructions in
order to preserve issues for appeal. This leads to a trial judge being deprived of
arguments that could help provide the most accurate instructions. Even if there is no
objection, fundamental error arguments would still be preserved.
Other members of the Committee felt that the rule should not be amended because there
often was not enough time to review instructions and articulate objections. Many felt
instructions should be treated differently because it is the duty of the trial court to instruct
the jury on the law such that any error in the instructions could be raised on appeal
without an objection. Justice Burdick noted that one problem with the current rule is that
it often leaves the court with the entire burden of doing the instructions. Requiring an
objection would reapportion the responsibility for accurate instructions to the prosecutor,
defense counsel and the court.
Molly Husky discussed differences between issues of fundamental error, preserved error
and harmless error.
It was obvious that there were irreconcilable differences on this subject and a straw pdll
was taken with the result being 6 in favor of changing the rule and 6 opposed, with one
abstention. It was decided that that best way to present the issue to the court would be to
have one person from each perspective submit a written letter setting out arguments for
the members and the court to review. Michael Henderson had really already done this
from the side of the state, and the Chair wanted to give defense counsel on the Committee
the same opportunity. The letters will be circulated with the minutes and a ballot will be
sent out on the issue. Both letters will be submitted to the Court with the minutes for the
Court's consideration.
Accommodating Hearing Impaired Jurors.
The Committee received a copy of a memo that was written by Tom Frost at the request
of Judge Darla Williamson on the issue of the state's obligation to provide a sign
interpreter for a hearing-in~pairedldearjuror, who is otherwise qualified to serve. One of
the issues involved is how to protect the sanctity of the jury if an interpreter is allowed
into the jury room. The memo indicates that the Fourth District is handling the issue at

. .

the local level by alIbwing an interpreter to accompany ajuroiaRer signing an oath. The
question for the committee waswhether a statewide rule should be adopted to address the
issue.
There was concern about an interpreter who used signing being in the jury room because
of the fact that this is not a literal translation, and various fornls of technology were
discussed. Members were more comfortable with the idea of having a court reporter
who used real time reporting so that the juror could read what was being said on a screen
and other jurors would know that what they said was being literally reported.
The consensus was that this Committee did not have the expertise needed in this area to
make a recommendation and that this might be an issue better left at the local level now
as it presents adn~inislrativeproblems. It was also recommended that the issue be
referrcd to the Fairness and Equality Committee.
Victims Rights
The Committee had received a letter from MADD suggesting that the Committee
consider a rule requiring- courts to ask prosecutors if crime victims had been notified of
their tights and of ;he court proceedings.
After discussion the consensus was that prosecutors are aware of this duty that is required
of them and that any omissions are due to oversight. It was felt that it is not the role of
the courts to check on prosecutors and it would take away from the court's appearance of
impartiality.

It was decided that no rule change was needed and that Justice Burdick would write a
letter to MADD explaining the Committee's position.
Rule 24 and Trial Jurors.
The Committee was asked to review the removal of jurors by lot and to clarify when
alternate jurors had to be sequestered. Subsection d(1) states that those removed by lot
may be discharged afier the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the court otherwise
directs as provided below. Subsection d(2) then provides that if the court determines that
those jurors removed by lot must be available then the bailiff, sheriff, or other person
appointed by the court shall take custody of the jurors until discharged by the court.
Some judges have interpreted this language to mean that the alternate juror always has to
be sequestered until the jury finishes its deliberations because there is always the chance
the alternate may be needed. Other judges have let the alternate leave with instructions
not to discuss the case in the event he or she is later needed.

If the jury is sequestered then the alternate must also be sequestered, but in your average
case it was felt that there should be a way to release the alternate with appropriate
instructions.
The committee voted unanimously to recommend the following amendment to (d)(2):

'.Jurors removed by lot, If the court determines that those jurors removed by lot must be
available to replace any jurors who may be excused during deliberations due to death,
illness or otherwise as determined by the court, &githe bailiff, sheriff, or other person
appointed by the court shall take custody of the sai$- removed jUJ0rS until discharged by
the court; however. if the iurv has not been sequestered then the jurors removed by lot
may be released by (he court with appropriate instructions."
There was further discussion as to the system of removing jurors by lot. Some members
found this made it harder to exercise peremptories and were concerned about not
knowing which of the jurors would be the actual twelve deciding the case until the very
end. Most of the members indicated a desire for the parties to know who the alternates
would be at an earlier stage in the trial even if the jurors themselves were not made
aware of this fact. The Committee did not have access to the Jury Committee report that
resulted in the removal by lot system, but it was the Committee's understanding that the
change was to make sure that all the jurors stayed involved in the case. There was a
motion to strike the removal by lot system in the rules but that motion failed in a 5 to 8
vote.
now provides that jurors be moved by lot at the conclusion of closing arguments
The
and there was a motion to change this sentence to provide that the jurors be moved "at a
time prior to deliberations" to allow flexibility to do it earlier. The idea was still that only
the parties would be aware of who the alternates were if they were designated at an
earlier time. The Committee then voted to table the issue until further study could be
done and the Jury Committee report reviewed, and it was suggested that a conference call
could be held on this at a future time.
It was also noted that there may be a need for a rule addressing the removal of alternate
jurors in death penalty cases since after deliberations and return of a guilty verdict the
jury would have to be present for the sentencing proceeding. Jurors removed before
deliberations at the guilt phase would have to be present during the sentencing phase.

I.C.R. 5. Initial Aooearance
The Committee was asked to review whether the time frames set out in the rule as to the
initial appearance and determination of probable cause conflicted or needed clarifying.
The consensus was lhat the rule was clear and no action was taken.
Reinstatement of I.C.R. 25
The Committee received a letter fron~the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers requesting the reinstatement of Rule 25, the disqualification of judges without
cause. The IACDL argues that citizens facing a deprivation of liberty deserve the same
tactical tools available to businesses and individuals involved in civil cases, and asserted
that reinstatement of the rule would not cause undue delay or unjustified expense.
When Idaho had the rule it was part of a very small minority of states that allowed a
disqualification without cause in a criminal case. A public defender or prosecutor who
consistently disqualifies a judge that they have to appear before on a daily basis can

really effect the system more so than a practitioner in a civil case and there was also
concern over disenkanchising voters. However, it was argued that there are sometimes
good reasons to avoid certain judges, that both sides have a fundamental tight to a fair
trial, and that administrative concerns should not be elevated over the fairness of the trial.
Defense counsel stated that having the rule was helpful in dealing with defendants and
without ever exercising the rule made it appear they had some control. Almost all of the
members said they had never disqualified a judge without cause when the rule existed
and believed the rule was suspended due to a few persons in one or two counties.
There was a suggestion that the rule be reinstated with a caveat that an administrative
district judge could temporarily suspend the rule in any district where in the ADJ's
opinion the rule was being abused and adversely impacting the administration of justice.
However, there was concern that this type of a condition could give rise to an equal
~rotectionargument and cause other problems.
Grant Loebs stated that he had talked to the leadership of the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys
Association and, like the IACDL, they were in favor of reinstating the rule.
The ~om&tteevoted unanimously to recommend that Rule 25 be reinstated.
I.C.R. 33(c 1 on plea withdrawal.
Currently the mie does not have a time limit on motions to withdraw a guilty plea, but in
a recent case, State v. Jakoski, 2003 WL 22439868 (Oct.29, 2003)' the Idaho Supreme
Court stated that absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction the trial court's
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final,
either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment. In this case, the
court held that, since Jakoski did not appeal his judgment, then it became final 42 days
later and the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider his motion to withdraw his plea
that was filed after this time frame.

in response to this case, Molly Husky proposed that Rule 33(c) be amended to set out an
extended time frame to file a motion to withdraw a plea, suggesting it be either I20 days
similar to a Rule 35 motion, or 180 days. The Committee agreed that there was an
inference in Jakoski that the mle could be amended, but a number of questions arose as to
why there should be additional time aIlowed to withdraw a plea once the appeal time has
expired and why this could not be handled as an issue in post-conviction relief when
there is one year to file that action.
It was suggested [hat Molly send a specific proposal to Justice Burdick to be circulated
with a ballot along with the minutes.
The meeting adjourned at approximately 3:30 p.m.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE AlTORNEY GENERAL

LAWRENCEO. WASDEN

December 19,2003

Justice Roger S. Burdick
ldaho Supreme Court
P.0 Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Dear Justice Burdlck:.
At the November 21 meeting of the Criminal Ruies Advisory Committee, there
was discussion of amending Rule 30 of the ldaho Criminal Ruies to require the parties
to state their objactians to the jury instnrctions in order to presewe instruction issues for
appeal.
Such an amendment would bring the rule into conformity with the
corresponding provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the conclusion
of the discussion of this issue, you invited the members on each side of this issue to
submit their views to the Court in writing.

My previous leder to Cathy Derden, which was distributed to the members of the
committee, sets forth the arguments for amending Rule 30. 1 would like to ask the Court
to consider the points addressed in that letter, and to also submit some brief additional
thoughts.
First, as pointed out prevlously, the holding of State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 225,
229, 786 P.2d 1127 (1990), thatthe failure to object to an instruction at trial in a criminal
case does not constitute a waiver of any objection to the Instructions on appeal: is
contrary to the general rule that appellate courts will not consider issues that are
presented for the first time on appeal. What is rema$able is that neither the SJ&
opinion nor other opinions of this court provide any actual rationale for such a deviation
from the general rule.
relies simply on the view that the 1980 amendment of Rule
30 was intended to make it possible to raise on appeal issues relating to the instructions
that were not raised in the trial court. This view was recently reiterated in State v.
Mdeskev, 138 ldaho 691, 695,69 P.3d 111 (2003). Assuming this view to be correct,
it still leaves unanswered what possible reason there could be for the 1980 amendment
to Rule 30. it should be recalled thet even in the absence of Rule 30, the general rule
requiring an objection in the trial court to preserve an issue for appeal would,
presumably, be applicable to issues involving jury instructions. If the 1980 amendment
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was intended to provide a different rule for jury instIUcti0n issues, the question remains:
Why? What possible justification is there for such a deviation from the general rule?
Second, as noted previously, courts in other jurisdictions generally require
objections to jury instruction to preserve issues for appeal. ldaho is apparently the only
jurisdiction in the country that allows appellate review of all claims of instructional error
regardless of whether an objection was raised below. Some courts hold that all
objections to jury instructlons not raised to the trial court are waived. See, e.g, Allison v.
State, 200 So.2d 653 (Alabama 1967); Smith v. State, 565 So.2d 904, 907 (Ga.App.
2002); State v. Gordon, 809 A.2d 748, 750 (N.H, 2002); p e o ~ l eV. Jordal, 742 N.Y.S.2d
760. 761 (N.Y. A.D., 4th Div. 2002); State v. Williams, 223 S.E.2d 38, 43 (S.C. 1976).
Most courts hold that, in the absence of a trial objectlon to jury instructions, the
appellate court will review only for clear or fundamental error, or will otherwise require
an elevated appellate standard. E.g. United States V. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 265-67 (3d
Cir. 2007); Unlted States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1070 (6th Cir. 2001); United States
V. Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 509 (7th Cir. 2002): United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d
892, 894 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Romero, 282 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2002);
Dobberke v. State, 40 P.3d 1244,1246-47 (Alaska App. 2002); State V. Canez, 42 P.3d
564. 587 (Az. 2002); People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 777 (Ca. 2002); Peooie v.
Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155, 160-61 (Co. App., Dlv 3, 2001); State v. Smith, 742 P.2d 451,
454-55 (Mont. 1987): Rossana v. State, 934 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Nev. 1997); State v,
Griffin 46 P.3d 102,105 (N.M. 2002); State v, Geukqeuzian, 54 P.3d 640,642 (Ut. ~ p p .
2002);State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 164, 204 (Wash. 2001); &own V. State, 44 P.3d 97, loo
(Wyo. 2002). This latter rule is the one that would be consistent with Idaho's approach
to the presewation of issues for appeal, and is the one that should be adopted.

-

?-

These two considerations- the inconsistency of the current rule with Idaho's
general rule requiring objections in the trial court, and its inconsistency with the rule in
other jurisdictions-are worth weighing in addressing the primary argument put forth by
the opponents of the proposed rule change at the commitfee meeting. There, the
opponents appeared to contend that framing objections to jury instructions at trial, in
view of the pressures and time constraints assoclated with trial practice, was just too
difficult a task.
it should be noted that other trial situations place more demanding burdens on
counsel, yet that does not remove the necessity for timely objections. For instance,
Rule 103(a) of the ldaho Rules of Evidence requires a timely objection to rulings
admitting or excluding evidence, and states that errors may not be predicated upon
such rulings in the absence of such an objection. (There is an exception forplain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court:
Rule 103(d).) An objection to testimony at trial often requires counsel to make virtually
instantaneous decisions based upon such considerations as the legal propriety of the
evidence offered, whether the evlden,ce'will be damaging or helpful to counsels

.
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case, and whether an objection will simply call attention to evidence that may be
harmful to counsels case. Such decisions are not easy, but, as we all kndw, trial
practice is a demanding discipline. By contrast, trial counsel genbrally have much more
time to weigh the propriety and usefulness of proposed jury instructions. Any lawyer
who can offer objections to testimony should be able to do the same when it comes to
jury instructions.
Further, defense counsel in other states are able to cope with a rule requiring
objections to jury instructions. Indeed, counsel here in Idaho are required to do the
same when they appear in federal court.
Finally, as an example of an attorney's making a tactical choice to withhold
objections to jury instructions with intent to instead raise those issues on appeal,
attached is a page from a transcript in a case currently pending on appeal, State v.
Tibbs Docket No. 27837. On page 455, lines 3-20, the court asks if there are
objections to the jury instructions and counsel replies by declining to comment "given the
current state of appellate procedure." I do not mean to suggest that there was anything
improper or unethical about counsers conduct in that case. But it is worth noting that
trial courts should be afforded the benefit of counsels thoughts on the jury instructions,
and should not have to resort to cross-examination of counsel in order to determine
their views and objections.

-.

The proposed 'amendment to Rule 30 would bring our practice into line with
Idaho's historic precedents, our general rules pertaining to preservation of issues for
appeal, the law in other jurisdictions, and common sense. We ask the Court to consider
the proposed amendment to the rule.

MICHAEL A. HENDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
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DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTTNG ATTORNEY
canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldweil, Idaho 83605

JAN 2 9 2007

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
E BULLARD. DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,

1
)

DefendanttPetitioner,

j

vs.

)
)

CASE NO. CV0700728

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through its attorney, the Canyon
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and answer the allegations of Petitioner's Petition for Post
Conviction Relief as follows:
I.
The Respondent admits Paragraph(s) 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19,20
and 23 of the Petition.
11.
Respondent denies Paragraph(s) 12, "11. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner
Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial" in its entirety including paragraphs 14,
15, 16, 17, (counsel is without adequate information to either admit or deny on the basis that
ANSWER
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay ans.wpd
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these allegations lack the specificity required under I.C.R.. 57 and I.C. $19-4901 and 19-4903)
and "111. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel on Appeal" in its entirety including paragraphs 21, and 22 (counsel is without adequate
information to either admit or deny on the basis that these allegations lack the specificity required
under I.C.R.. 57 and I.C. $19-4901 and 19-4903) of the Petition.
111.
Responding to the specific allegations of the Petitioner's Petition, the Respondent
denies each and every allegation not expressly admitted, denied or otherwise responded to herein.
IV.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Petitioner's claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
the Petition should be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4906.

v.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Idaho Code, Section 19-4901(b) requires post conviction relief under Idaho law

as prayed for by the Petitioner be an exclusive remedy in place of all other remedies challenging
conviction or sentence. The Defendant has appealed his conviction to the Idaho Court of
Appeals in Case No. 3 1652 who has affirmed his conviction and sentence. Therefore, the
Petitioner has improperly presented a Petition before this Court for post conviction relief and
Petitioner's Petition must be dismissed.
VI.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant has failed to provide the appropriate affidavits, records and other
evidence supporting his Petition pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4903, thereby making
Petitioner's Petition insufficient to sustain the requirement for a proper application for post

ANSWER
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conviction relief and must, therefore, be dismissed.

VII.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in criminal case
CR0321789 in Canyon County District Court are sufficient to allow the court to make a decision
upon the Petitioner's Petition and said record and pleadings are sufficient to find that no purpose
would be served by a post conviction relief proceeding and, therefore, the Petitioner's petition
should be dismissed.
VIII.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The record and pleadings in the above entitled case and in criminal case
CR0321789 are the entire record in the matter and that record supports the finding that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a summary judgment and/or dismissal in favor of
the Respondent is warranted pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4906(c).
WHEREFORE, The Respondent prays this court to consider the Petitioner's
Petition, the Respondent's Answer and the pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in
criminal case CR0321789 and act as follows:
1.

Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the above entitled action

without further hearing and pursuant to Idaho Code provisions 2 9-4901 et seq.;
2.

may deem proper.

Grant the Respondent such other relief, legal and equitable, as the court

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to
Petition for Post Conviction Relief was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho
y
83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this&
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of January, 2007.

DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

CANYCN COUNTY CLERK
E BULLARD, DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,

)
)

CASE NO. CV0700728

j

MOTION TO STRIKE
UPCRA PETITION

Defendantipetitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent
State of Idaho, who pursuant to I.C.R.P. 12(e), I.C.R.P. 12 (f), I.C.R. 57, Idaho Code $19-4902,
and Idaho Code 9 19-4903 moves the Court to strike the "Verified Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief' filed herein for the reasons that:
1.

The pleading does not comply with I.C.R. 57(a) as to form and content.

2.

The pleading does not contain sufficient factual allegations as what conduct is
alleged to qualify as a cause of action or ground of relief under I.C. $19-4901.
Petitioners "headings" are not factual allegations, but are conclusory legal
statements. &, King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct.App. 1988);

MOTION TO STRIKE UPCRA PETITION
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay strikcmot.wpd
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Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,715 P.2d 369 (Ct.App. 1986), and Smith v.
State, 94 Idaho 469,491 P.2d 733 (1971).
3.

The pleading does not sufficiently identify in a non-conclusory manner what any
potentially cognizable claims for relief are.

Oral argument is requested.
DATED thi~ ~ G a n u a r2007.
y ,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to
Strike UPCRA Petition was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83702,
i b a n u a t y , 2007.
counsel for Petitioner, on or about thi f -

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO STRIKE UPCRA PETITION
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DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
E BULLARD, DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,
DefendantIPetitioner,

1
)
1
)

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

j

?

CASE NO. CV0700728
EX PARTE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL UNDER
I.C. §19-4906(b)

COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent
State of Idaho, who moves the Court for an Order of Summary Dismissal under LC.§ 19-4906(b)
on the basis that the Verified Petition filed herein is insufficient to entitle Petitioner to post
conviction relief under I.C. $19-4901 et.seq., and that no purpose would be served by further
proceedings.
No argument is requested as the Court can review the entire record herein, the record
under State v. Shane McKay, CR0321789C and Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 31652 to make
this determination and issue an appropriate written order and decision.
EX PARTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL UNDER I.C.§19-4906(b)
H:\MOTlON.ORD\mckayexparie
molsumdis.wpd
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as+
-day of January, 2007.

DATED this

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ex Parte
Motion for Summary Dismissal under I.C. 4 19-4906(b) was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O.
@kf
Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this&
2007.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL UNDER I.C.9 19-4906(b)
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckayexparte
motsumdis.wpd
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January,

DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
CaldweI1, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAIiO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,

)
)

Defend;

j

j

VS.

)

CASE NO. CV0700728

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

COMES NOW, Respondent State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney of record, the
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who pursuant to I.C.R. 57(b), Aeschliman v.
State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct.App. 1999) and Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602,21
P.3d 924 (2001) objects to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery. The basis
for the objection as follows:
1.

Discovery in Post Conviction Relief cases is limited under the above authorities
and is allowed only with court authorization. Unless discovery is necessary to
protect an applicant's substantive rights, the District Court is not required to order

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMSSION
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
1
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckayobj.wpd

discovery.
2.

The denial of discovery does not involve a fundamental constitutional right. In
order to be granted discovery, a post conviction applicant must identify the type of
information that he may obtain through discovery that could affect the disposition
of his application for post conviction relief.

3.

In his motion, Petitioner seeks lo take the depositions of Attorneys Richard Harris
and Justin Curtis 3 Jason Pintler, and specifically wants to discover
"2.

Had Attorney Harris reviewed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision
in State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.2d 410 (Ct.App. 2005)?'

4.

Petitioner's counsel has requested "judicial notice of the files and records in
v. Shane McKay, No. CR0321789 and the file, record, transcripts and exhibits in
State v. Shane McKay, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 3 1652." Those files
contain the various motions, jury instructions of the Court, proposed jury
instructions of the Defendant, the arguments of counsel, and voluminous other
materials relevant to this action, all of which are readily available for review by
the Petitioner.

5.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference are the following
exhibits:
A.

I.C.J.I. 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER

B.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, filed October 29,2004.

C.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, lodged October
22,2004.

D.

Reporter's Transcript CONFERENCE ON INSTRUCTIONS, October 29,
2004.

E.

Reporter's Transcript CLOSING ARGUMENTS, October 20,2004.

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
2
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay obj.wpd

F.
6.

State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct.App. 2005).

The reason asserted for the proposed discovery is frivolous, unwarranted, and
shows a lack of reasonable inquiry under I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(l). As stated above, jury
instructions were proposed by Attorney Harris on October 22,2004. The jury
instruction conference was held on October 29,2004. The Court's jury
instructions were given to the jury on October 29,2004.

was released and

filed on January 10,2005, SEVENTY THREE DAYS AFTER THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN. The asserted basis for post conviction relief
and the need for discovery is premised upon the theory that counsel was
ineffective for failing to review an opinion at a time when the opinion did not
exist. It is premised upon a case decided under Idaho Code Section 18-4006(3)(6)
when Petitioner was charged and convicted under Idaho Code Section 184006(3)(b). Petitioner was convicted under the Felony Vehicular Manslaughter
statute, not the provisions of the misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter statute at
issue in McNair.
Respondent requests the Court enter an order denying the Petitioner's Motion for
Discovery. Oral argument is requested.
DATED fthi*&

January, 200'7

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
3
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay objwpd
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772,
G o
Boise, Idaho 83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about thi 8 -
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H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay obj.wpd

f January, 200'7.
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ICJI 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol] ;
[andl
[4. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence;
and]
[4][5]. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in
such unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to
the death of [name of decedent (s)I .
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert
description of misdemeanor or infraction] [driving while under
the influence of alcohol] is committed when all of the following
are found to exist:
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions]
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the
state has proven each of the above, including each component of
the unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol]
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
Comment
I.C.

§

18-4006.

The committee chose to use the term "unlawful act," rather than
mcrime,l'in paragraph number 3. An infraction could constitute
the offense that gives rise to the vehicular manslaughter
charge. Infractions are criminal offenses. State v. Bennion, 112
Idaho 32, 730 P.2d 952 (1986).
This first alternative paragraph number 4 should be used only
when the defendant is charged under IC § 18-4006(3) (a). See ICJI
342 for definition of Itgrossnegligence."
[Revised July 20051

C N Y O h ! COLIN"/ CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO

Plaintiff,

1

1
1

1
)

-vs-

SHANE MCKAY
Defendants.

1
1
1

1

)

CASE NO. CR-03-21789-C
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

INSTRUCTION NO. 101
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to
reach your decision.
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has
presented its case.
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence.
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time
for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help
you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence,
neither are the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave the
courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with
you my instructions, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in
court.

INSTRUCTION NO. 102
This criminal case has been brought by the state of Idaho. I will sometimes refer to

the state as the prosecution. The state is represented at this trial by a deputy prosecuting
attorney, Virginia Bond and Gearld L. WoUI: The defendant, Shane Mckay, is
represented by Richard L. Harris. The defendant is charged by the state of Idaho with a
violation of law. The charge against the defendant is contained in an Information. The
clerk shall read the Information and state the defendant's plea
The Information is simply a description of the charge; it is not evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 103
Under our law and system ofjustice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.

First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that
burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence,
nor does the defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason
and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to
act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence
you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must fmd the defendant not
guilty.

INSTRUC77ON NO. 104
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state
the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding
others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before
you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful
performance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of justice.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.

This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received,
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I

sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely
on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any

problems. Your are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly.
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial.
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you
attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday
affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much

weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you shouid apply
in your deliberations.

In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness
had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consi&er the

qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

LNSTRUCTION NO. 105
If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggests to you that I am inclined
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will 1 intend to intimate,

any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard
it.

INSTRUCTION NO. 106
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty
to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

INSTRUCTION NO. 107
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night,.please leave your notes in the jury
room.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. Ln addition, you cannot assign to one
person the duty of taking notes for all of you.

INSTRUCTION NO. 108
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during
the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night.
First, do not taIk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone eise during
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room.
Second, do no let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does
tak about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to

the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors
about what has happened.
Third. during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are
entitled to expect from you asjurors.
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an
explicit order from me to do so.

You must not consult any books, dictionaries,

encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do
so.
Fifth. do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented

in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have
happened.

INSTRUCTION NO.201
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to
the law.
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a d e or law different from any I
tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1A

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, as charged in the
information, the state must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. On or about the 51h day of October, 2003,

2. in the state of Idaho, Canyon County,
3. the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actualphysical control of
4. a motor vehicle

5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the
public,
6. while under the influence of alcohol

while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of
defendant's blood,

7. and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. you must find the defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201 B
The phrase "actual physical control." means being in the driver's position of the
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving.

INSTRUCTION NO.201C
The term "highway" means the same as "street" and includes public roads, alleys,
bridges and adjacent sidewalks and rights-of-way.

INSTRUCTION NO.201D
To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, it is not necessary that
any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown. The state need o d y show that the
defendant had consumed sufficient alcohol to affect the defendant's ability to drive the
motor vehicle.

NSTRUCTION NO. 201 E
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If

you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that
precise date.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1 F
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act

and intent.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1G
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be
considered for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for
which it was admitted.

mSTRUCTION NO. 201H

You have heard the testimony of Tina Hoover concerning a statement made by
Mike Warren before this trial. The believability of a wimess may be challenged by
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not
consistent with the wimess' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be
considered by you only for the purpose of deciding whether you believe Mark Warren's
testimony. This evidence of an earlier statement has been admitted to help you decide if
you believe Mike Warren's testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as
evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2011
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to

testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt From the fact
that the defendant did not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your
deliberations in any way.

INSTRUCTION NO. 206
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence
presented in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of:
1.

sworn testimony of witnesses;

2.

exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and

3.

any facts to which the parties have stipulated.

Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:

1.

arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is
included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts

as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them,
follow your memory;
2.

testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been
instructed to disregard;

3.

anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session.

~NST~UCTION
NO. 207

I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will
retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
The arguments and statements of the attomeys are not evidence. If you remember
the facts differently from the way the attomeys have stated them, you should base your
decision on what you remember.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertaimnent and
declaration of the truth.
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of
the evidence you have seen and heard in this coutroom about this case, together with the
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions.
During your deliberations. you each have a right to re-examine your own views and
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual

judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourselt but you should do so only after a
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the
jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.

INSTRUCTION NO. 208
You have been instructed as to dl the rules of law that may be necessary for you to
reach a verdict.

Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your

determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.

NSTRUCTION NO. 209

The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They
are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on

them in any way.
The instructions are numbered for convenience in refwring to specific
instructions. There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there
is, you should not concern yourselves about such gap.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21 1
Upon retiring to the jury room. select one of you as a presiding juror, who wit1
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that
the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has
a chance to express himself or herself upon each question.

In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court.
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise.

If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully
discussed the evidcnce before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate

with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how
the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unIess you are instructed by me to do so.
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you

with these instructions.

DATED This

a TiaykC.
of

-7

2003

RICHARD L. HARRIS
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1438
1023 Arthur
Caldwefl, Idaho 83606
Phone: (208) 459-1588
Fax: (208) 459-1300
ISB No. 1387
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

1
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR-03-21789

)
)

1
1
1
1

VS.

SHANE MCKAY,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant by and through his attorney and submits
their proposed Jury Instructions and Respectfully request this Court to consider said
instructions in instructing the jury in this action.
DATED: This

$day of October, 2004.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I the undersigned do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was served on the following this

a

day of October, 2004.

United States Mail

DAVID L. YOUNG
Canyon County Prosecutor
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

0

Hand Delivered
Facsimile

000084
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTlONS - 2

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of
alcohol; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist:
1.

That on or about October 5, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle;

4.

Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public;

5.

While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine
or breath.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must Find the Defendant not guilty.

000085

If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
ICJI 709

Instruction No.
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of
others.
ICJI 341

Instruction No.
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and
intent or criminal negligence.

I.C. 18-114
ICJI 305

Instruction No.
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption

places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus,a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to

human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they wuiot say
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
ICJI 103

Instruction No.

You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.
State v. Holder, 1100 Idaho 129,594 P.2d 639 (1979)
State v, Hwnphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000)

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"It shall be unlawfui for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any
vehicle which does not contain those parts w is not at all time equipped with the
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho
Code. "
A violation of the statute is negligence.

IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motorcycle and every motor-driven cycle shall carry at least one
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [LC.49-

9071
A violation of the statute is negligence.
IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Nothin herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle t h w m or older
of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1) inch
in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the
requirements of I.C. 49-906."
A violation of the statute is negligence.
IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motor vehicle...shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than
twenty (20) inches. [LC.49-9061
A violation of 'the statute is negligence.

IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.
The term "negligence" refers to a lack of that attention to the probable
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to
the person's own affairs.

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of
alcohol; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist:
1.

That on or about October 5, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle;

4.

Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public;

5.

While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine
or breath.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must find the Defendant not guilty.

00089G

If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.

Instruction No.
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of
others.

Instruction No.
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and
intent or criminal negligence.

Instruction No.

A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt. you must return a verdict of not guilty.

A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.

Instruction No.

You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to.the
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho
Code. "
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motorcycle and every motordriven cycle shall carry at least one
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [I.C. 49-

9071
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1)
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the
requirements of I.C.49-906."
A violation of the statute is negligence.
IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motor vehicle...shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than
twenty (20) inches. [LC. 49-9061

A violationof the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.
The term "negligence* refers to a lack of that attention to the probable
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to
the person's own affaim.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Nothing herein shall prohibit -the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1)
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the
requirements of I.C.49-906. "

A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:

I.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted
limit but without gross negligence; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must find the Defendant not guilty.
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
ICJI 709

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003:

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted
limit but without gross negligence; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must find the Defendant not guilty.
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
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THE COURT: All right. We're taking up

11 State vs. McKay outside the jury presence, Ihave been
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1
MR. HARRIS: Judge, if it please the
2 Court. Ihave submitted to the Court this mornins after
the eiidence has been presented an instruction 6n
vehicular manslaughter that is an instruction that
would activate subpart (c) of the vehicular
manslaughter statute.
And Ioffer the instructions on this
basis. The State has charsed under cart (b), which is
a felony. There is eviden6 under the record that
Shane McKay may weil have operated this vehicle with a
BA less than -08. Because of the differential in the
time that the BA was taken and the time of the
accident, the jury
could weil find that that didn't
~.
apply.
The jury could find, because of the
speed issues that were presented in evidence of this
case, that the unlawful act which triggers the
culpability could be the infraction of a speed greater
than the speed limit, which would then bring into
operation the misdemeanor section of the statute, so
the evidence would support the misdemeanor instruction.
And it seems to me that the manner in which this case
has been charaed would also aive the Court authoritv
24 for the giving 6f this instruct&.
We have talked briefly about cause, and
I125
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the dilemma is what to do about cause. And I have
essentially taken the position that cause is something
that I'm not requesting a jury on this morning, but
it's certainly part of the dilemma.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr, Woiff,
MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, under
Mr. Harris's theory and under the statute as alleged,
there is either, A, no lesser included under the
vehicular manslaughter as we have charged under
subsection (b), or there are two lesser includeds, both
(a) and (c), felony vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence under the interpretation of the facts that
Mr. Harris wants to give. I wanted to make a record of
that.
He's talking about the speed and only
the speed. He's not talking about the crossing over of
the double yellow line at the railroad track to
oncoming traffic and running into the back of the
motorcycle proceeding down the roadway in his lane of
travel. That's gross negligence. It's reckless to
cross the double yellow or to cross over a centerline
at a railroad track. That's the statute. That's the
reckless driving statute.
So there is more than enough evidence to
15

meeting with the attorneys regarding proposed final
instructions, and Ihad caused to be delivered 201, a
verdict form, through instruction 211. Iwas also
provided with a proposed instruction drafted by the
defendant with regard to a lesser included of
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
I'lltake up at this time first with the
State. Mr. Wolff, do you have objections or concerns
regarding the instructions or the verdict form?
MR. WOLFF: Judge, on the packet of
instructions that you have provided to us, no, I do not
have any objections.
THE COURT: Ail right. Thank you.
Mr. Harris.
13
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support the lesser included of felony vehicular
manslaughter as much as there is to support a
misdemeanor manslaughter without gross negligence.
That's not how we have it charged, We '
have this charged as subsection (b), under the
influence and/or, in the alternative, with a BAC over
.08. There's sufficient evidence in the record.
Mr. Harris wants to attack the BAC, but if you remember
Officer Woolery -- excuse me Officer Marek's
testimony at the point when she made contact with Shane
McKay at the scene within 10,15 minutes of the
accident, her opinion was that he was under the
influence of alcohol, so that fact is right there at
the scene.
Judge, we have charged under subsection
(b). We don't believe there is a lesser included of
misdemeanor manslaughter on the charge or the facts
that you have presented to you. Mr, Harris wants to
nitpick each and every fact here, and using his theory
and logic, every criminal case would have some type of
lesser included, and that's not the law. Lesser
includeds are those offenses that come from the main
charge that are factually supported by the charge and
for which there's legally sufficient basis for a
finding of guilt.

--

16

He can't have it both ways, I f he has a
lesser included, it's felony vehicular manslaughter
before they even reach the misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. We don't believe that it's appropriate
for a lesser included.
THE COURT: All right, Thank you.
The Court has given a lot of thought to
whether the iving of a lesser included offense could
be given or e jury could be instructedto consider.
And in doing so, Iwent back and looked at the two
analyses for the consideration of lesser included.
A lesser included offense is one which
is necessarily committed in the commission of another
offense or, one, the essential elements of which are
charged in the Information as the manner or means by
which the offense is committed, and that's State versus
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,1979, and ICR 31(c).
Having considered both ways to look at
this, Ialways have to go back to the Information in
this case, which specifically charges that Shane McKay
did unlawfully, without malice, kill Ted Cox by
operating a motor vehicle in the commission of a
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004 under the
influence of alcohol in this case.
So in analyzing this, Ifurther go back

tfi.
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to obviously the statute, vehicular manslaughter.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, and vehicular can be committed in three
different ways,
. . (a),
. .. the commission of an unlawful act
not amounting to a felony with gross negligence, and
(c), the commission of an unlawful act not amountinq- to
a felony without gross negligence.
The State did not elect to charge under
(a) or (c). They chose instead to charge under (b),
the commission of a violation of Section 18-8004 or
8006. I n this case, they elected the driving under the
influence under 8004.
Ialso looked specifically how Idaho
defined gross negligence. Essentially, gross
negligence is such negligence as amounts to wanton,
flagrant, or reckless disregard of the safety of
others.
And Mr. Harris has offered this
instruction. Ibelieve that Iam precluded from giving
it because this proposed misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter instruction can only be a lesser included
under (a) of the statute. I n other words, it can only
be a lesser included because it would be less than
gross negligence. (A) is with gross negligence. (C)
is without gross negligence.
1R

Iagree that in their cross-examination
of the State's experts that they may have raised --the
defense may have raised the issue and it was admitted
that Shane McKay's BAC could have been less than -08 a
the time that it happened, so that's going to have to
be an argument that's made to the jury.
And as Isee it, we're left with the one
instruction and the one verdict form, so I'm going -the instructionwill be ~resewedfor appeal that was
proposed, and I'm ready to instruct the jury as I
proposed in the instructions,
Mr, Harris, did you have any other
concerns you wanted to raise about the verdict or the
instructions?
MR. HARRIS: Judge, just one other
comment. Iunderstand the Court's ruling and will
accept that ruling for purposes of this morning. But I
probably -- and I just need to clarify my record on
this, and that is that, as Iunderstand that statute,
it talks in terms of an unlawful act that caused the
death.
The first one is an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony with gross negligence. The
second one is an unlawful a 4 meaning the DUI or being
under the influence, The third one is an unlawful act

<7
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not amounting to a misdemeanor --yeah, a misdemeano~
not a felony, but without gross negligence. And so as
Iread these three statutes together, it becomes an
included offense because we're talking about an
unlawful a d in each event.
They've elected to charge under one
felony statute, and the unlawful act could be the
misdemeanor. They could find without gross negligence,
which would bring into play number three.
But Iunderstand the Court's ruling and
we will proceed from there, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. At this time,
then, we'll go ahead and have the jurors brought down
and we'll proceed with final instructions. We are in
recess.
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accountability is the factor.
I n this particular case, the person who
made those choices is Shane McKay. He made the choice,
number one, to consume alcohol. He made the choice,
number two, to drive an automobile. And he made the
choice, number three, to drive that automobile in a
reckless and careless manner taking the life of Ted
cox.
This is no accident. This is a wreck.
Shis is a collision, This is a crash. This is what
11 we're here about today and what we've all spent the
last four days covering as evidence.
The State does have the burden of proof
as always, and the State has to prove certain things.
And to prove certain things, we have presented facts
through testimony here. You must weigh and determine
which of those apply and basically decide what happened
in this case.
Let's go over those elements first.
19
20 This is kind of what Icall the building blocks of our
case. First of all, the State must prove that this
crime occurred on or about October Sth, 2003. Several
people have talked about that, police officers, Mike,
Monique.
That this crime occurred in Canyon

il
4

(Counsel for respective
parties present, along with
the defendant.)

**********

MS. BOND: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. First of all, let me start off by telling
you how much we greatly appreciate your time, your
attention, and your presence here, Without that, we
couldn't work this great system of justice that we all
are within, and we're proud of it. So on behalf of
myself and Mr. Wolff and the prosecutor's office, we
17 thank you.
Let me draw your attention to one thing
18
19 as Istart opening argument here. Notice, if you will,
20 that Ihave never used the term "accident" during this
21 presentation of the case, and there's a reason for
22 that, because this case was not an accident. This case
23 is a situation of willful conduct, This is choices
24 that were made by an individual, and these choices
25 resulted in the death of someone's loved one, and
22
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County, state of Idaho, Police officers again. I t
happened behind the Lowe's. Yes, that's in Canyon
County, state of Idaho.
Number three, that Shane McKay drove or
was in actual physical control. He admitted it,
admitted it to Tonna Woolety.
Motor vehicle, the Cadillac that is
sitting over at the shop that you saw,
And this happened upon a highway,
street, bridge, or property open to the public.
Several officers testified about, that that's a road
they travel every day. Ed Robertson, for one, told you
about that road and the contour of it specifically,
And under the influence of alcohol,
four, over .08.
These are the building blocks of this
particular case, and I've gone over some of the facts
that you've heard in court through the testimony that
support that. So once you realize, of course, that
this is not an accident, the way that we start with
looking at it is the first person that we heard
testify, Steve Wood.
Steve didn't know these folks that were
coming in front of him. He looked up. He was driving
that road with his kids in the pickup and saw two
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the car and somebody running around outside the car,
He was tremendously angly, Someone had just killed his
friend, his brother. He went over and he grabbed this
person and he hit him and he put him down on the ground
by his friend and stayed there holding him until the
police arrived,
And when they arrived, the first one
that came there was Tonna Woolery. She was a
relatively new officer that came upon the scene. She
was the first one there. She went over to where Shane
McKay was, and in her conversation with him, she
noticed a few factors.
This is State's 25. She smelled the
odor of an alcoholic beverage. She saw bloodshot eyes.
She saw some behavior that concerned, and his speech
was slurred, the things he was saying, so she made a
decision that he was perhaps under the influence of
alcohol and asked him if he'd been drinking, He
admitted it, He'd been drinking. So when she looked
at the scene and saw that there wasa deceased there,
the decision was to take him to the hospital where
Stephanie Brannan drew blood and Tonna Woolery took
custody of it and that blood went to the lab.
Dave Laycock analyzed it, and Dave
Laycock testified that the blood alcohol content was a

lights. He thought first it was a car. No, it's too
wide. Those are motorcycles. So he had his window
open. He looked out and admired the motorcycles going
by him, and he looked up and saw a car halfway in his
lane.
He was crossing the railroad tracks the
bikes had just crossed. He saw this car coming at a
high rate of speed and swerved back into the other lane
heading toward K-mart, and he thought he doesn't have
room, there's not enough room. Just as he thought
that, he heard the crash, saw the dirt fly. The
tremendous noise that accompanied this crash woke his
little giri up.
He pulled over to the side of the road
and called the police as Monique ran toward him
frantic, He didn't go back to the scene, but his
impression of this was very clear in that he saw the
motor vehicle coming, it was on the wrong side of the
road going back Into the other lane, and heard the
crash.
And remember, Iasked him if he had any
background in ejtimating speed, and his estimate was 60
miles per hour, So when you look at the facts that
Steve purported, they line up with what also Mike and
Monique testified to.
lr
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Mike and Monique were there. They were
on the motorbike next to Mr, Cox situated closest to
the centerline of the road. Mike was also driiing a
Harley-Davidson and Monique was on the back, and her
job was to check all the taillights and all the
equipment on the bikes. They had gone to Denny's to
get the ranch dressing, had gone by the sugar beet
factory, had come over the overpass to the highway and
was headed towards Shari's to eat
They reported, both of them, that this
is a hard tail motorcycle. It's got no shocks, so you
have to go slow over bumpy areas like railroad tracks,
so they slowed down. As they slowed down, they went
over the railroad tracks and they both looked over at
Ted, and he was laughing, he was smiling, making some
gesture. Suddenly, he was gone. He was gone forever.
They felt this great rush of wind, and Ted was gone.
There was parts of metal. There was
dirt flying in their faces, They never saw it coming.
They never saw it coming, which might be a clue to
interpreting what Ed Robertson testified about.
They pulled the bike over. It came to a
stop. Mike ran over and found his brother, who he
refers to as his brother, dead, obviously dead. He
- looked over and saw
covered him with his leathers-and
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.15,which is almost twice the legal limit Impairment
at that particular level would match up with the
driving behavior in this case, according to Ed
Robertson.
.15 was within an hour and a half of the
wreck, Dave Laycock testified that it would take
approximately seven drinks to get to that point, plus
some additional ones to keep that level going. So you
can figure out if he hit Mr. Cox at this particular
time and the blood came at this particular time, when
would he have consumed those seven drinks. And the law
in this case is perfectly clear. If you're over a ,08,
you are driving under the influence, and if you drive
under the influence and kill someone, then you shouM
be held accountable.
After Dave Laycock testified, you
further heard the testimony of Tony Evans. Now, Tony
Evans came upon the scene after Tonna Woolery. He also
had conversation with Mr. McKav and told vou that he
smelled alcohol and saw his bloodshot eyei. Both
officers saw the same impairment indications.
Tony made these measurements back here,
measured from the railroad track, took those ~ictures.
and found what he thought was the point of impact. '
State's 18 is that gouge
-- mark in the
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1 pavement. This is the issue that Ed Robertson covered
2 with you, this gouge mark and the tire prints that are
3 aiong each side of it. His interpretationwas that
4 that gouge mark came from the car hitting the
5 motorcycle and the motorcycle's back tire stopping and
6 that caused the rubber burn. He addressed how the
7 motorcycle went sliding down the pavement and ended up
8 riaht whereTony says it ended up,. . and it should have
9 eiided up there.' '
10
Ted's body ended up at this point at a
11 lesser distance than the motorcycle. And it makes
12 sense, of course, with the direction the Cadillac
13 traveled which ended up right there high-centered on
14 that particular curbing.
As Tony was there at the scene, he was
15
16 taking measurements from Midland Boulevard, which is
17 somewhere out here. He took photographs. He saw what
18 he termed as vapor trails, And there's been a lot of
19 discussion about those vapor trails. We had a lot of
20 education yesterday. Iwas really confused with the
21 math, Ihope everybody else was too.
22
But those vapor trails and those pieces
23 and fragments laying on the roadway are only leading up
24 to the point where Ted's body is and that motorcycle
25 is, and then there's a big gouge mark right there.
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Fred Rice testified that those liquids
didn't have time to s ill out until they got further
down the road, whic is consistent with velocity in
that cup thing that he showed us. So all that
testified to is consistent with the facts and the
measurements that Tony Evans took and is consistent
with the eyewitness testimony of Steve Wood, Mike, and
Monique.
And you also saw this motorcycle, so ou
know how hard it was hit. This motorcycle was it so
hard, State's 10, that Tony Evans had to pull that
license plate out of the back side of that motorcycle.
It was embedded in there. He didn't even see it at
first. And that license plate goes to the Cadillac.
The other thing that Tony Evans found at
the crime scene, 22 and 23, are pictures of the license
plate. You can study these more closely when you get
back in the jury room. And Mr. Paulson showed you how
the brackets on this attach to the light fixture that
was affixed to the back of Ted's motorcycle. Three
people testified they saw that light there that night,
Mike, Monique, and Mr. Pauison, they saw that light.
This license plate was affixed to it. Without the
light, the brackets of this license plate wouldn't have
held it in place,

I n this particular case, the big
question is was this vehicle out of control, and both
experts talked about that Let's think about what Fred
Rice said first of all, He said he took those
measurements, he took the photographs, he looked at
them, he put together the information and provided a
re~ortwhich indicated that this was a vehicle out of
cdntrol. It was out of control back here, clear back
here before the railroad tracks. And as it's out of
control there, it's coming across the railroad track
leaving those scuff marks. Not tire marks. Scuff
marks, That shows out of control.
It veers into the lane here, and Ed
talked about an angle, talked about an angle and, bang,
it hits into that motorcycle and sends it flying. This
is an action out of control. You lose control here,
you overcorrect to go back into your lane, and that's
what resulted in this impact, Why Mike wasn't hit and
Monique wasn't hit, it's somebody bigger than us with
them that day.
Ted was, Hopefully, Ted never saw what
was coming. The paramedics told you what his injuries
were, He had a fractured skull. He had broken bones
in his arms and legs, He had a broken neck. These
particular injuries are consistent with the motor
7n

vehicle wreck that we've described here, and they
killed Ted Cox.
Fred Rice did not do speed based on one
factor. Fred Rice did not do speed based on one
factor. Fred Rice did speed based on three, the
Cadillac, the body, and the motorcycle, and he came up
with approximately the same figures. Conservatively,
65 miles per hour is the speed he figured, and he had
the numbers. He even variated the numbers up there on
the witness stand. These were cold, hard, scientific
numbers. These aren't guesses and these aren't
daydreams. These are based upon the measurements of
Tony Evans out there at the scene.
And not only did he do it three ways, he
ended up doing it the fourth way right in front of this
Court with the splatter information. Remember when he
dropped his pen and that was like a time-distance
thing? He put it into the range that Icould
understand of the motor vehicle and how the motor
vehicle could impact the motorcycle pushing it forward,
State's 9, this impact right here to the
rear of the motorcycle is what we're talking about. It
was a very hard impact. It wasn't a little bump. This
was a smack, a high degree of velocity which sent the
Cadillac, the motorcycle, and everything down the road.
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again as soon as Mr, Harris is finished, but we would
ask you to once again consider all the facts before you
make a decision, ihank you.
ME COURT: Thank you, Ms. Bond.
Mr. Harris, you may proceed.

Ted was very proud of this motorcycle he
called Mumm. He'd had her longer than Mikey's been
alive, and that motorcycle was a big part of who he
was. He went to that shop every Saturday. His friends
rode, This is his fun and his enjoyment, and he took
pride in her, and there's this taillight right there
with his license plate on it. Why would he take that
off? I t wouldn't be safe. They check on that for each
other. It wouldn't be safe.
Because of Mr. McKay's careless driving
and his choice to consume alcohol, Ted Cox was killed
violently. There's brain matter along the road. There
was brain matter around him and coming out his ears.
He had breakage. He flew through the air quite a
distance. His glove, his glasses, the vest, everything
flew off of him as he was pushed by the weight of the
Cadiilac.
Remember, Ed Robertson testified that
Cadillac probably weighs 4,000 pounds. There's no
pavement that's even going to stop that Cadillac, and
that's what hit Mr. Cox at 65 miles per hour from
behind sending him vaulting through the air.
What about Ted Cox's drinking that
night? It was the last night of his life. He was
visiting friends. He saw his mother. He was,
33

MR. HARRIS: I f it please the Court,
counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I'm a Cubs
fan, but how about those Red Sox? Iwish we were here
talking about baseball rather than what we're talking
about this morning,
This is an unfortunate and tragic
accident, It's tragic to both families and to their
friends. But, ladies and gentlemen, what this is is an
accident.
This is what is known as closing
arauments. It's the time that the attorneys set an
opportunity to visit with you as jurors. whatwe say
to you is not evidence. Iwant you to be perfectly
clear about that. I f your recollection of the evidence
is different than mine, you rely on yours. I'll not
try to mislead you, but as I've indicated, if your
recollection is different than mine, you know what you
7C

according to the experts, in his proper lane of traffii
right here. He wasn't swelving. He didn't pull out in
front of Mr. McKay. He was in his proper lane of
traffic, He was drinking, true, but drinking doesn't
involve the death penalty.
Was there any contributing factors I
asked each of the experts. The only contributing
factor was that he was there. This was not his fault.
And Ted had a good life. He shared it
with his loved ones, and they are robbed of him because
of the choices that were made by Mr, McKay, the choices
to consume alcohol, the choices to drive a car, and the
choices to drive that car in a reckless and dangerous
manner. Because of those choices, he killed Ted Cox
and robbed him of life. And for this, he should be
held accountable.
This is not an accident, This is
willful conduct. What you need to do is consider the
facts, the testimony, the blood alcohol content, what
the reconstructionist said, what the eyewitnesses say,
because if you think about it in the big picture,
you'll see what Steve Wood said about speed and
position and what both the experts said about speed and
position are the same, This was no accident.
- .to address you
I'm going to be able
CANYON COUNTY CASE NO. CR2003-21789
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need to do,
Let me talk about this instruction that
you have received, That instruction lists those six
items that the prosecutor has put up on that board, but
unfortunately or intentionally, the prosecutor has
failed to put one other additional element that is part
of that instruction, and I'm going to take the liberty
of putting it on there because as you get that
instruction in the jury room, you'll notice that there
is a number seven, and that number seven has the word
"cause" in it.
The way the vehicular manslaughter
statute is written, it is written in the format that
the driving of the vehicle and the commission of an
unlawful act that causes death is a violation of that
statute.
In this particular instance, in order
for there to be a violation of the statute, you must
find that Shane McKay drove the vehicle we don't
deny that on a highway. That's obvious. It's
alleged by the prosecution that he was either under the
influence or had a BA greater than -08 or .08 or
greater.
And they stopped right there because
they take the position that if you do that, you are
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1 guilty. That's not the instruction on the law that has
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been given you by Judge Hoff because it contains the
additional word, that must cause the death of Mr. Cox.
There's another instruction that needs
to be talked about briefly, and that is that in every
criminal offense, there must exist the joint operation
of act and intent And where is the act and the intent
in the evidence that you've received that caused the
death of Mr, Cox?
Let me just address some issues having
to do with evidence in this case. And there's a number
of issues that you'll have to sort out with reference
to the testimony of Mr. Warren, Ms, Crownhart, and
Scott Paulson. There is the issue of the position of
the bikes on the roadway, There is the relationship of
those bikes with each other.
There is the issue of the drinking of
Mr. Cox. You?l remember that they said that he'd only
had one drink, that he was essentially a non-drinker,
and yet, it's not possible under the law or under the
facts that a person driving on the roadway with a -19
BA was not a factor in what happened.
But I'm verv well aware of human nature
and Iknow that friends and, in this case, brothers,
shade the truth. Ithink Scott Paulson and all said,
77
JI

1

11

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

possible that his BA was less than .08.
He said it would take seven -- Ithink
it was seven drinks. Idon't know how many of you are
familiar with drinks. I'm not. Ihad learned this.
But supposing he had a Long Island iced tea justbefore
he leR where he was, that contained enough alcohol to
get you there, but there's an absorption rate, there is
an elimination rate.
And it may have been a .I5 an hour and
forty minutes after the accident, but as their expert
says, it could very well have been less than -08 at the
time of the accident. Ladies and gentlemen, that is a
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution wants you also to
believe that the injuries received in the accident
caused the death of Mr. Cox. and it seems clearlv
apparent that that's the case. And because it seemed
apparent to the people
in charge of this, no autopsy.
.
.
was ordered.
Ladies and gentlemen, I've been either a
prosecutor or defense attorney for over thirty years
and I've handled lots of homicide cases. This is the
first case that an autopsy hasn't been performed.
And I'll tell jldu why an autdpsy is
performed, It's not only to establish cause of death,
10

J7

1 but it's to establish that cause of death to the
1 you know, we will cover for each other, and that's
2 exclusion of every other cause and to establish
2 going to be important later on in my argument. But
3 evidence,
3 it's your assessment of the credibility of those
4
MS, BOND: Your Honor, I'm going to
4 witnesses and the assessment of where they say things
5
object
to
him
testifying about some facts that were not
5 were in the entire context or the totality of the
6 circumstances of this case.
6 in evidence.
7
ME COURT: I'lloverrule the objection.
7
You have heard evidence, and Iwould
8 Ithink he can make his argument. I'llcontinue to
8 submit to you that Shane was very much traumatized by
9 entertain that issue if you want to revisit it.
9 what happened. They described him as crying, and the
10
MR. HARRIS: Idon't know if any of you
10 picture that was put on the screen indicates that he
11 watch Law and Order on television. Approximately a
11 was crying. It's obvious that his eyes were red. He
12 week ago on that episode of the program, there was a
12 had been battered by Warren.
Ithink he said that -- Ithink there
13 situation that occurred -- Ididn't see the program,
13
14 but it's been related to me -- that a person, a
14 was some evidence that while he was crying, he was
15 pedestrian, was struck by a car.
15 praying. He kept repeating it was an accident, I
16
The injuries and cause of death seemed
16 didn't mean to hit him, he popped out of nowhere, I
17 clearly evident by what occurred, When they performed
17 didn't see him, if was an accident. He kept repeating
18 the autopsy, they discovered a subdural hematoma that
18 that over and over.
Now, the prosecution wants you to
19 had occurred as the result of an occurrence some time
19
20 prior, and it was that subdural hematoma that was the
20 believe that at the time of this accident, Shane was
21 cause of death, not what appeared to be the apparent
21 under the influence or over the legal limit. And even
22 injuries of the carlpedestrian accident. Ladies and
22 though there was a BA of .IS, as Irecall,
23 gentlemen, that's another element of reasonable doubt
23 approximately an hour and forty minutes aRer the
24
24 accident, the State's expert, the witness they called,
Idon't know how many of you watch Bill
25 O'Reilly and The O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News
25 said that at the time of the accident, it's entirely
38
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channel, but he describes his program as being a
no-spin zone, and he uses the word --a word that I
learned, Inever heard it before then, but he used the
word "blowitate," which means, in the vernacular that
I'm familiar with, don't baffle me with your BS.
And let me talk about that in context
with some testimony. And in this particular case, each
side is represented by an attorney, Each side has had
exoert witnesses come and testifv. There's been a lot
of 'evidence regarding credentials'and qualification and
that one side's credentials, because they belong to
oroanizations. that makes them somehow more credible
a d more important than the other side.
But to put that again in context, I'm
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho but I
don't belong to the American Bar Association, Idon't
belong to the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, Idon't
belong to the Idaho Criminal -- or the Idaho Lawyers
for Criminal Justice. Does that make me any less a
lawyer qualified to come before you and represent my
client in this case? Iam licensed to practice before
the courts in the state of Idaho, before the federal
courts in Idaho, before the Ninth Circuit, and before
the United States Supreme Court, but Idon't belong to
these voluntary organizations.
41
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illuminated by the headlight.
And Iagree with him that it takes 204
feet to stop, but what he did not include in that
number is some reaction time on the part of the driver
to perceive and to apply the brake, Once the brake was
applied, it's 204 feet, but there is a lag time in
order to get there. That's how facts are massaged and
manipulated.
And so Iauess what I'm trvino to ooint
out there is that he'; telling the truth as far &the
truth goes, but the answer is not complete. And
because it's not comolete, it's misleadina, The fact
that there is a reaction time there exteds, in that
instance, the stopping distance by almost a third. So
instead of stopping at 250 feet within the headlight,
you stop at 290 feet.
In addition, Inoticed the tendency to
filibuster, to manipulate information. But, ladies and
gentlemen, you are the arbiters of their credibility
and their testimony.
One of the things about this case that
has been a puzzle to me for a long time and is a
disagreement between the State's case and their experts
and me and my expert, and that has to do with this
point of impact because that is an important
A,
75

Ms. Bond, in the course of the
consideration for you as jurors in this case.
examination of Mr. Freeman, worked him over about that
Where is the point of impact? You
listened to the testimony of Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood
affidavit. Unfortunately, Iwas the one that drafted
the affidavit And we were in a hurry and he signed
testified that had the car crossed over his lane, went
it, but that's what happened.
off the left edge of the road and tried to come back,
Let me come back and talk about the
there would have been a head-on collision with him.
1 7 experts for just a minute, and particularly Mr. Rice
You listened to his testimony as he said with reference
1 8 to the car that was coming down in the other lane of
1 8 and Mr. Robertson and some contradictions in their
9 traffic, it crossed, he believed, the centerline, went
testimony opinions.
First, Rice testified that the proof of
10 back into that lane, I t never did come completely into
11 his lane of traffic. And again, on this diagram, if
impact where it is on that diagram over there was
12 that occurred, it would have been much further down the
caused b the rim --the rim of the rear wheel of the
motorcyce. Robertson said it was a cross-member on
13 road to the east than what is depicted here. He would
14 have seen that. He never saw it. He never testified
the Cadillac. Rice said it was a straight-on
15 to it,
collision. Robertson said it was at an angle.
He testified as to what happened, and
And they gave a lot of testimony, but
16
17 Mr. Rice's comment about his testimony was, well, he
let me try and give you an example of the subtlety of
the testimony and the ability to massage and manipulate 18 didn't perceive it correctly, he didn't see what he
19 saw. Whv is that imoortant with reference to this
facts to comport with their formulas and so forth.
20 point of impact and why is it important with the
Talking about that no-spin zone, you
remember Mr. Robertson talking about a requirement that 21 testimony of the experts that reconstructed this
22 accident?
a headlight had to illuminate the road 250 feet ahead
23
It's important because the State's
and that he used Ibelieve it was 65 miles per hour and
24
that a car stops in 204 feet and, therefore, he should
experts did not reconstruct this accident. What they
less
- than the 250 feet
25 have done is they have taken Officer Evans' -- yeah,
have stopped because that is.
44
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Tony Evans' theory of this case and they have defended
it. And Brant Freeman looked at these same facts and
reconstructed the accident as to what happened.
And you remember and Idon't remember
whether it was Mr. Rice or Mr. Robertson that testified
that reconstruction of an accident is taking all the
pieces of a puzzle, all of the elements that are there,
and putting them together and figuring out what
happened.
Now, that wasn't really what happened
here. What really happened is that they, as experts
for the State, took the theory of this accident
formulated by Mr, -- Gff~erEvans and defended it.
Brant Freeman took those same facts, totality of the
facts, and in my judgment, determined what really
happened, and this is why. You'll remember during the
course of the trial -Could Ihave Exhibit A, please?
You're going to have this when you get
in the jury room, but during the course of the trial, I
had the witnesses look at this numerous times. And if
you go to page 3 -- page 1and 2 depict the roadway of
Karcher before you get to the railroad tracks and it's
got what purports to be where the Cadillac left tire
left the roadway, came back on
.-the roadway. The second

trail. We're talking about marks. From 220 feet,
which is from this pointto this point, it's labeled
rear wheel skld mark of motorcycle, 220 feet.
if you listen to Mr, Robertson and
.. .
Mr. Rice, the motorcycle --when this accident
occurred, the motorcycle laid right down and skidded
along the pavement all the way to where it came to
rest. There are no marks for the first 83 feet. There
should have been marks, and there were none,
The only thing that can explain that is
that the motorcycle was airborne for that 83.1 feet and
finally it landed and then the marks began. That
contradicts --and it would be impossible in the first
place because of weight and gravity, but it contradicts
the testimony of Mr. Rice and Mr. Robertson because
there would have been marks and there were none. And
then finally, there's another 87 feet where it finally
came to rest from the marks that were put on the road.
And then we come back to these distances
having to do with the vapor trail, and those are the
numbers in the upper right-hand corner of page 2 of the
exhibit, The distance that they have established on
these notes is the vapor trail of the motorcycle
started at 780 feet west, and that is by a process of
.- And Idon't claim
subtraction, if my math is correct.

page again has the railroad tracks. It has the
point -- what Tony Evans alleges the point of impact to
be. And then it has the distances from that point to
where Mr. Cox was, to where the motorcycle was, to
where the tlre marks first went onto the curb and where
the Cadillac came to rest.
And up in the right-hand corner of that,
you'll also notice the vapor trial of number two, which
is the Cadillac, vapor trail number one, which is the
motorwcle. And vou'll all orobablv remember the
testimdny having i o do wiih those'vapor trails or, as
Mr. Freeman describes it, the liquid debris.
The third paqe of this exhibit is
14
important for you on'cejou get in the jury room to
discuss this accident You will notice that at the
15
bottom of this exhibit, there is a gouge mark
16
purporting to be where the point of impact occurred.
17
That gouge mark corresponds with the gouge mark on the 18
second page, which is where they allege the point of
19
impact was,
Coming back to the third page, this was
measured bv Officer Corder of the ISP and Officer
Evans. ~ r o mthe gouge mark to a point 83.1 feet
23
downrange from that gouge mark, there are no marks, no 24
25
marks. We're not talking about liquid debris or vapor

to be the qreatest mathematician. but it's 74.5 feet
from this point of impact The vapor trail of the
Cadillac starts at 790 feet west, and that number -where have Igot it here on my notes -- is 73.5 feet.
Excuse me. IYs 79 feet.
So how do you put this together? What's
the meaning of that? The vapor trails and the marks
correlate very closely. The debris field starts
downrange from 83.1 feet. That's where the debris was
found. We know that if the point of impact was where
the say it is, there would be marks on the roadway by
bot vehicles, particularly the motorcycle, during that
83.1 feet where they measured. They looked. They
never found any.
Thats what Brant Freeman was testifying
about because that has to mean that the point of impact
is down there where this 83.1 feet, that number is. He
said that it has to be in close proximity to that
number. That makes sense to me.
As you look at the totality of the
evidence of this case, the theory of this accident
propounded by Officer Evans doesn't make sense. It
doesn't make sense for a number of reasons, not only
the testimony of Mr. Wood, but the marks on the roadway
as they come across the railroad tracks.
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And. again, that was a puzzle to me
because Ibelieve it was Mr. Rice that said, well,
these are scuff marks, the ones that come from the
eastbound lane into the westbound lane, and they look
identical to the marks that are in the westbound
lane -- or excuse me --yeah, to the eastbound lane,
but those are not xuff marks, we don't know what they
are. And you look at them and they look identical.
And Brant Freeman testified that he looked at them and
blew the pictures up, looked at them under a magnifying
glass and could see no difference. That doesnY make
sense.
The speed doesn't make sense because
what haooens with the ooint of imoad with the State is
you've g i t to elevate those speed; It's actually 71
miles an hour. And Mr. Rice hedged a little bit saying
it was 65, but his calculation is actually 71 miles per
hour. If he was off the left edge of the roadway, in
1.1seconds, you've got to cross over across the
railroad tracks and get situated in the westbound lane
of traffic to directlv collide with the motorcvcle. I
suppose that's poisible, but the probability'of it, of
that occurring, you know, it just isn't there. That
doesn't make sense.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you retire to

1 accident -- or excuse me -- of the motorcycle at the
2 time of the accident. There wasn't any changes. Some
3 of those witnesses worked on it, but there weren't any
changes. That's the way it was. That's the way it
was.
And yet when they got to the scene of
the accident, the only thing that was found there was
the license plate, and they took pictures of the
license plate. We've got those photographs here. Is
there a difference between the license plate on the
ground and the license plate on the motorcycle?
And when you get in the jury room and
you look at these photographs, you will see that there
is an acorn nut missing from the license plate and you
will notice that that nut is missing on the bottom
left. And you'll notice that in the photograph of the
license plate on the ground at the sene, that nut
that's missing is the upper right. What does that
signify? What does that mean?
If you look at this -- let me try and
explain it as best Ican. When it was first
photographed, as Iunderstand it, it was face down, the
numbers were face down. That license plate was
originally paft of a -- there was a bracket that is
part of the unit that fits the taillight, the taillight
r,

AP

the jury room, you bring with you your common sense and
your experience, what makes sense to you. And Isubmit
that, at least to me, what makes sense is not the
theory of the accident that Officer Evans came up with.
That just doesn't make sense to me at all.
I f Brant Freeman is correct and the
point of impact is downrange from where they got it to
the close proximi of 83.1 feet, that significantly
reduces the spe of the vehicles. That is reasonable
doubt.
A number of years ago Iwas In a trial,
and Ithought the case was one of those slam-dunk
cases, there isn't any way in the world that you can
lose it. And Iwas taught a lesson by a very good
trial lawyer, one of the better ones in Idaho, and he
said that in the course of a trial, there is usually
something that occurs, probably that seems to be
insignificant, but as you analyze it, it really
determines what really is the case.
And so since then, I have sort of paid
attention to that, and Ithink there's such a thing in
this case, and I'm going to start with this. This is
the motorcycle, It's the pre-accident motorcycle. You
listened to all the witnesses testify that, as far as
they knew, this was an identical representation of the
50
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housing, and there is a piece of steel that fits on
the -- that would fit on the back of the license plate
which supports and provides protection and support to
the license plate.
We all know how flimsy license plates
are. But this piece of steel encapsulates the license
plate, and it is that piece of steel to which these
bolts that I've indicated to you from the other
photograph, that's mounted to the bracket that is part
of that taillight housing, and that's what attaches
them all together.
It's obvious that that license plate was
broken. It was broken away from the taillight. Well,
when did that occur? It did not occur when this
accident happened, I t occurred sometime prior to that.
It occurred sometime between August 16 when that
photograph was taken and the time of the accident.
And then let me bring you back to Scott
Paulson's testimony, Scott Paulson testified that he
and Mr. Cox were together and they had a runin with
another guy on a motorcycle. They took their
motorcycle and chased that guy down, cornered him, and
there was an altercation. He testified that there was
damage done to the motorcycles. He testified there was
damage done to Mr. Cox's motorcycle. He testified
F*
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1 there was a dent in the fuel tank. He did not testify
2 that there was damage done to the taillight, but it
3 certainlv could have occurred then. But, ladies and
4 gentlemen, it occurred sometime between when that
5 ohotoaraoh was taken and the accident because the baits
6 are cknged,
I f you'll remember the testimony of all
7
8 the witnesses -- well, most of the witnesses anyway -9 there is no lens glass from the taillight on the ground
10 or anywhere at the scene of the accident. I f you look
11 at the metal, and they describe it as being pot metal,
12 probably is, but that is a large piece of metal that
13 houses that taillight. None of that metal was found.
14 Officer Evans testified he searched for hours trying to
15 find it. He didn't find it, Why didn't he find it?
16 The license plate was there. That taillight and that
17 housing was not there. There was not a taillight on
18 the Cox motorcycle that night.
Idon't know when the damage to it
19
20 occurred. I t certainly could have occurred when Scott
21 Pauison and he had the altercation with the other guy
22 on September 20th. I t could be that they ordered
23 another one in and it hadn't arrived yet so they hadn't
24 put it on and they attached the license plate with a
25 wire or something because he was driving around. But
53
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the taillight was not there. And as Mr, Freeman
testified, you can't yield to what you can't see.
And if you come back to cause -- see,
that's number seven on the board that the prosecutor
leR out --what was the cause? The cause was no
taillight, He couldn't see it. Mr. Cox was driving.
We know that he had a -19at the time of the accident.
Was that a contributor, the fact that he was driving
out there without a taillight? In my judgment,
certainly.
Ladies and gentlemen, reasonable doubt
has been shown, There is reasonable doubt in this
case, Irecognize, and Mr. McKay and his family
recognize, how tragic and unfortunate this situation
is. But, ladies and gentlemen, it was an accident.
Iask you to return a verdict of not
guilty because the State has not met its burden of
proof, and the only way justice will be accomplished in
this case is by a return of not guilty.
Again, Ithank you so much for your
attention, for your time that you've spent, that you've
given in considering this matter, Thank you very much.
ME COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harris.
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MS. BOND: The State in this case had no
intention of ieaving out number seven --this is why we
get the last word here -- because number seven is all
about Ted Cox. That's what this case is about. That's
what we're going to focus on here once again in our
rebuttal is number seven, It sums it all up because
Mr. Harris didn't give you the whole picture either.
Let's put it down here in totality. And
the defendant's, which is Mr. McKay, operation of the
motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox, a human
being. He did cause the death of Ted Cox. That's
exactly what this case is about. I'm glad he pointed
that out for me because that is the most important
element exactly, dead on.
Ted Cox had a life and he had a family
and he deserved to live. He was killed by a driver
that was under the influence of alcohol, You heard it,
this is an accident. This is no accident. This is
willful conduct.
We should rely on the testimony of an
expert who hasn't had any updated training for fourteen
years, who is paid a large amount of money to come up
with a theory that fits for Mr. McKay, an expert that
didn't come up with any numbers, didn't do computations
for you, an expert whose attention to detail is quite
CE

evident from the affidavit, that's who we're supposed
to rely on?
And for some reason, he knew there was
no taillight? Whose fault is it that that taillight's
gone? The car hits it full speed, almost 70 miles per
hour, and it's gone and that's Ted's fault? There was
a screw found by Ed Robertson and the other mechanic in
the fender with a piece of pot metal on it with a fresh
break. Remember that testimony. Remember that
testimony because that's important, A fresh break, pot
metal, explodes, a huge crash, lots of power. That was
not Ted's fault. Ted was not driving the Cadillac.
Mr. McKay was driving the Cadillac. He was driving the
Cadillac after he had drinks and he was driving fast.
This is also what this case is about.
It's about the obvious. Well, they didn't do an
autopsy. Let's take a look at this. It's real small
here, but not really when you get this picture. You
will see this right here. That's what's left of
Mr. Cox, That's a piece of brain matter that's along
the highway. Let's not look at the obvious, Let's
look at the little tiny detail.
They're asking you to speculate that
there's no taillight so there's no responsibility here.
Do we want to decide this case based on speculation or
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do we want to decide this case based on fact, a fact
like depicted here, a fact like brain matter, a fact
like a license plate shoved all the way into this
motorcycle that Tony had to pull out of there, facts
like a gouge mark, which is a mark, it's a mark prior
to 83 feet?
We're trying to manipulate the facts
here, manipulating the information? Every one of the
State's experts had numbers, they had credentials.
They do this work currently. They are up to date,
They teach others. They have a law enforcement
background and training and it's current.
He has an expert that says it's police
policy to seize vehicles, which both officers said it's
not the case. They don't keep these vehicles unless
requested by the prosecutor's office.
And intent, act and intent. Another
good point made by Mr, Harris because the act here, the
act of how he drove that vehicle, running off the road
out of control, coming back onto the road at a high
rate of speed. Sure, the car's a good car. It could
have made it, but the driver wasn't capable. The
driver was impaired. Reckless conduct slamming into
the back of Ted Cox. The act itself is indicative of
what the intent was, Mr. McKay
-- made the choices here.

1
2
3
4
5
6

He made the choices to drink and drive and drive f a 9
not Ted Cox.
Iwant to address Steve Woods again once
more. Steve Woods was looking at the motorcycles
this is his testimony and when he looked up, he saw
the car halfway into his lane. Completely consistent
with the State's theory in this case.
They want you to believe that the
splatters and where the vehicles hit are clear down
here because it lessens the speed, of course, but does
that really make sense? Imean, you saw it right here
in court. Those fluids are not going to fall down if a
car is moving --let me see if Ican get it right.
Every second it moves 90 feet if it's going 60 miles
per hour. That's qulte a force. That's quite a push.
It's taking it down the road a way before it dumps it,
and that only makes sense. We saw it happen here in
court with the cup. So really, blowvitating? Who's
blowvitating here?
We want fact, we want the truth because
that's what justice is about, and Ted deserves it. He
deserves the truth and he deserves justice and so does
everybody else in society. I f somebody takes everybody
else's life on the road into their hands and dares to
go out and drive under the influence, they should be
58
CANYON COUNTY CASE NO. CR2003-21789
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 31652

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

--

--

punished, And in this case, a -15 is quite indicative
of over the legal limit.
Number seven is the crux of this case
because Ted Cox is the one that paid the price here.
The State is going to ask you to return a guilty
verdict for Mr. McKay. Thank you.
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48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIIIA) In General
48Ak342 Homicide
48Ak344 k. Manslaughter.
Most Cited Cases
Negligence on part of defendant was
required element of vehicular manslaughter.
I.C. 6 18-4006, subd. 3(c).

J2J Statutes 361 -181(1)
Background: Defendant was convicted in a
jury trial in the District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Valley County, Georae
David Carey, J., and Henrv R. Boomer. 111;
Magistrate, of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals,
J., held that:

a,

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k181 In General
361k181(1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 -184

negligence on part of defendant was
required element of vehicular manslaughter;
criminal
complaint
was
not
jurisdictionally defective for not alleging
that defendant's failure to maintain his lane
of travel was product of negligent act or
omission; and

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361k184 k. Policy and Purpose
of Act. Most Cited Cases

3
(J jury instructions were erroneous for not

Statutes 361 -208

requiring finding that defendant was
negligent before he could be found guilty of
vehicular manslaughter.

Vacated and remanded.
West Headnotes
Automobiles 48A -344

361 Statutes
Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and
Intrinsic Aids to Construction
361k208 k. Context and Related
Clauses. Most Cited Cases
When a court must engage in statutory
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construction, its duty is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature; in so
doing, appellate court looks to the context of
the statutory language in question and the
public policy behind the statute.
3
jJ Statutes 361 -223.2(.5)
361 Statutes
-

361VI Construction and Operation
-

361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k223
Construction
with
Reference to Other Statutes
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to
the Same Subject Matter in General
3611<223.2(.5) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
When an ambiguous statute is part of a
larger statutory scheme, appellate court not
only focuses upon the language of the
ambiguous statute, but appellate court also
looks at other statutes relating to the same
subject matter and consider them together in
order to discern legislative intent; even when
a statute is not ambiguous on its face,
judicial construction might nevertheless be
required to harmonize the statute with other
legislative enactments on the same subject.

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak35 1 Charging Instrument;
Summons or Ticket
48Ak351.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Criminal complaint was not jurisdictionally
defective for not alleging that defendant's
failure to maintain his lane of travel was
product of negligent act or omission in
vehicular
manslaughter
prosecution;
although complaint stating that defendant
slid his vehicle into oncoming northbound
lane was defective for failure to allege any
negligence or other culpable mental state,
both the first and second alternatives in
complaint that defendant drove carelessly,
imprudently or inattentively and drove at
speed greater than was reasonable and
prudent under conditions made clear
references to negligence. LC. 6 18-4006,
subd. 3(c).
Indictment and Information

Construction and Operation
361VICB) Particular Classes of
Statutes
361k241 Penal Statutes
361k24111) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
When a court must engage in statutory
construction, appellate court is obligated to
apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires
courts to construe ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of the accused.

210

-60
210 Indictment and Information
210V Requisites and Sufficiency of
Accusation
210k58 Subject-Matter of Allegations
k. Elements and Incidents
of Offense in General. Most Cited Cases
A charging document will be deemed so
flawed that it fails to confer jurisdiction on
the court if the facts alleged are not made
criminal by statute or if the document fails
to state facts essential to establish the
offense charged.

-

Ifll Statutes 361 -241(1)
361 Statutes
-

Automobiles 48A -351.1

Criminal Law 110 -1032(5)
110 Criminal Law
-
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Trial
1lOXX(G1 Instructions: Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k772 Elements and Incidents of
Offense, and Defenses in General
110k772(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A trial court must charge the jury with all
rules of law material to the determination of
the defendant's guilt or innocence; therefore,
the jury must be instructed on all elements
of the charged offense.

1121Criminal Law 110 -778(5)
110 Criminal Law
-

11OXX Trial
1lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k778 ~resumbtionsand Burden
of Proof
110k778(5) k. Shifting Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
The omission of an element of the crime
impermissibly lightens the prosecution's
burden of proof.

1131Criminal Law 110 -1181.5(1)
110 Criminal Law
11OXXIV Review
1IOXXIV(U) Determination and
Disposition of Cause
110k1181.5 Remand in General;
Vacation
110kl181.5(1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
When it is not possible to determine whether
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court
must vacate the conviction and remand the
case for a new trial.
**411 Wiebe & Fouser, Caldwell, for

appellant. Thomas A. Sullivan argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey
General; Melissa Nicole Moody, Deputy
Attomey General, Boise, for respondent.
Melissa Nicole Moody argued.
LANSING, Judge.
*264 Appellant Hugh S. McNair was
convicted of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter.
The issues he raises on
appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the
criminal complaint and the jury instructions,
require that we determine whether
negligence on the part of the defendant is an
element of vehicular manslaughter under
Idaho Code 6 18-4006(3)(c). We hold that
it is and therefore vacate the judgment and
remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND
On the evening of February 9, 2001, Hugh
S. McNair was driving southbound on
Highway 55 between McCall and Boise in
wintry conditions.
As he started to
negotiate a curve, McNair's vehicle crossed
into the opposite lane and collided head-on
with another vehicle.
Injuries from the
collision resulted in the death of Reed
Ostermeier, the passenger in the other
McNair was charged with
vehicle.
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter,
18-4006(3)(~).
The second amended complaint, upon which
McNair went to trial, alleged:
That the defendant, HUGH S. MCNAIR ...
did, unlawfully but without malice kill Reed
Elvin Ostermeier, a human being, by
operating a motor vehicle ... in the
c ~ m m i s ~ oofn an unlawful act or acts, not
amounting to a felony, without gross
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negligence, to wit; the defendant was
driving southbound at said location,
carelessly, imprudently or inattentively by
not paying attention and/or at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions or when approaching an
intersection and curve or failing to observe
special hazards that may be in existence by
reasons of weather or highway conditions
that caused him to apply his brakes, locking
up his wheels and/or sliding his vehicle into
the oncoming northbound lane striking the
vehicle driven by Heidi M. Ostermeier
killing Reed Elvin Ostermeier.
All of which is a misdemeanor in violation
of Idaho Code 18-4006(3)(c), and *265
**412 against the peace, power and dignity
of the State of Idaho.
At trial, the defense theory was that
McNair's vehicle hit a patch of ice on the
road as he was entering a curve, which
caused his vehicle to skid into the other lane
despite McNair's exercise of due care.
McNair was nevertheless found guilty by the
jury.
McNair's conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the district court on intermediate
appeal. On further appeal to this Court,
McNair argues that (1) the criminal
complaint was jurisdictionally defective
because it did not adequately allege that
McNair was negligent;
and (2) the
magistrate failed to properly instruct the jury
that negligence is an element of vehicular
m a n s l a ~ g h t e r .Both
~ of these issues relate
to the State's allegation that McNair caused
the victim's death by "sliding his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane striking
the vehicle driven by Heidi Ostermeier...."
Neither that portion of the amended
complaint nor the related jury instruction
expressly incorporated an element o f
negligence.

FNI. McNair also asserts that the
magistrate imposed an excessive
sentence, an issue that we do not
reach.

ANALYSIS
A. Negligence as an Element of Vehicular
Manslaughter

Both McNair's claim that the complaint
was jurisdictionally defective and his claim
of error in the iurv instructions reauire that
determine - whether
Gehicular
we
manslaughter may be a strict liability
offense or requires some degree of
negligence. Although the State conceded
before the district court that negligence is an
element of the offense, it now argues to the
contrary.
On the date of the accident, vehicular
manslaughter was defined in LC. 6 184006(3)fc) as follows:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice. It is of three
(3) kinds:

....

3. Vehicular-in which the operation of a
motor vehicle is a significant cause
contributing to the death because oE
(a) the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, with gross
negligence; or
(b) the commission of a violation of section
18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) the commission of an unlawfhl act, not
amounting to a felony, without gross
negligence.m
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FN2. This statute was amended in
2002 to include a human embryo or
fetus in the definition of a human
being. 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
350 2.
McNair was charged under subpart (c)
which, on its face, does not include an
element of negligence, but requires only an
"unlawful act" that significantly contributes
to the cause of death. The State contends
that McNair committed an "unlawful act"
when his vehicle crossed the center line, and
even if it occurred without his negligence,
he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter. m.2
McNair argues that the Idaho courts have
interpreted LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c) to include
an element of negligence and that, if the
statute is interpreted to create a strict
liability offense, it would violate the
constitutional right of due process.
FN3. Presumably, the unlawful act to
-

which the State refers is a violation
of LC. 6 6 49-630, .19-631 and/or
49-637.
Implicit in the State's
argument is the proposition that
these statutes prohibiting driving to
the left of the center line create
criminal liability even if the driver
was exercising due care. That is a
proposition that we need not address.
When a court must engage in
statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. State v. Shanks. 139 Idaho 152,
154.75 P.3d 206,208 (Ct.App.2003). In so
doing, we look to the context of the statutory
language in question and the public policy
behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd,137

Idaho 625. 627. 51 P.3d 439. 441
(Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute
is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not
only focus upon the language of the
ambiguous statute, but also look at other
statutes relating to the same "266 ""413
subject matter and consider them together in
order to discern legislative intent. Shanks,
139 Idaho at 154. 75 P.3d at 208: State v.
Paciorek. 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443,
446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is
not ambiguous on its face, "judicial
construction might nevertheless be required
to harmonize the statute with other
legislative enactments on the same subject."
Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 106, 785
P.2d 667, 670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are
obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity,
which requires courts to construe ambiguous
criminal statutes in favor of the accused.
State v. Wees. 138 Idaho 119, 124, 58 P.3d
103. 108 (Ct.Apv.2002); State v. Dewey,
131 Idaho 846. 848. 965 P.2d 206, 208
(Ct.Apv.1998).

An analysis of the mental element (if any)
for vehicular manslaughter under §..
4006(3Mc) requires consideration of not
only the language of that statute, but also of
two additional statutes. One of those is the
excusable homicide statute, LC. 6 18-4012,
which provides:
Homicide is excusable in the following
cases:
1.
When committed by accident and
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and
without any unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
sudden combat when no undue advantage is
taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and
when the killing is not done in a cruel or
unusual manner.
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The other is LC. 6 18-201( 3 , which
provides:All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging
to the following classes:

....

3. Persons who committed the act or made
the omission charged, through misfortune or
by accident, when it appears that there was
not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence.
In our view, 6 6 18-4012 and 18-201
collectively express a legislative intent that
there is no criminal homicide when a death
occurs through an accident and entirely
without any negligence or other culpable
behavior.
Although there are no previous Idaho
decisions directly addressing the issue
presented here, our interpretation of these
statutes draws some support from two prior
decisions, State v. Lona, 91 Idaho 436. 423
P.2d 858 (19671, and Haxforth v. State, 117
Idaho 189. 786 P.2d 580 (Ct.App.1990). In
Long, the defendant was charged with
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of
an automobile under then-existing I.C. 6
18-4006(2), which was very similar to the
present LC. 6
18-4006(31.~ Long
challenged
the
statute
as
being
unconstitutionally vague. In the course of
addressing that challenge, and ultimately
upholding the validity of the statute, the
Supreme Court stated:

FN4. The statute under consideration
in Long provided:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing
of a human being, without malice.
It is of two kinds:
1. Voluntary-....
2.
Involuntary-...;
or in the

operation of a motor vehicle:
(a) In the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a
felony, with gross negligence; or,
(b) In the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, and with gross
negligence; or,
(c) In the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a
felony, without gross negligence; or,
(d) In the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, but without gross
negligence.
The legislature, classified the crime on the
basis of whether it was committed "with
gross negligence"-a felony, or "without
gross
negligence9'-an
indictable
mi~demeanor.~
Such distinction,
considered in harmony with the provisions
of LC. 6 18-4012, indicates that the
legislature intended that only a degree of
negligence (as that term is defined by
18-101. subp. 2) less than "gross
negligence," but of a degree which would
disclose acts, conduct, or omissions not
embraced within the excusable homicide
state, i.e., "when committed by accident and
misfortune in doing '267 **414 any lawful
act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary
..." would constitute a
caution,
misdemeanor.

FN5. The same classification exists
under the present statutes. See
18-4007(3).

LC.

Lona, 91 Idaho at 442.423 P.2d at 864.
In Haxforth, the defendant had attempted to
pass another vehicle, at a time when there
was traffic in the oncoming lane.
This
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maneuver, which violated I.C. 6 49-634,
caused the death of a passenger in an
oncoming vehicle.
The State charged
Haxforth with misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter, alleging not gross negligence
but ordinary negligence.
Following his
conviction, Haxforth brought a petition for
post-conviction relief, asserting, among
other things, that LC. 6 18-201 precluded
his conviction because even if he was
negligent, he was not "culpably negligent."
In rejecting that argument, this Court stated:
Idaho Code 6 18-201 states that a person is
incapable of committing a crime if he
"committed the act ... through misfortune or
by accident, when it appears that there was
not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence." (Emphasis added.) In Statev.
Lonp, 91 Idaho 436.443.423 P.2d 858,865
(1967) our Supreme Court determined that
the reference to "culpable negligence" is
simply a reiteration of the excusable
homicide standard under LC. 6 18-4012. It
does not preclude imposition of criminal
responsibility for negligence under the
vehicular manslaughter statute. In essence,
we understand Long to mean that negligence
in committing an unlawful act, resulting in
death, is "culpable negligence." Therefore,
we conclude that Haxforth is not shielded by
LC. 6 18-201.
Haxforth, 117 Idaho at 191. 786 P.2d at 582.
It is implicit in these comments that
commission of an act (even if it is unlawful
under a strict liability statute) that involves
no negligence at all would not satisfy the
"culpable negligence" requirement of
section 18-201 and therefore would not
support a conviction for vehicular
manslaughter.
The State incorrectly contends that the
above passage shows that the Haxforth
Court
"interpreted
any
negligence

requirement
in
the
misdemeanor
manslaughter statute to require nothing more
than an unlawful act resulting in death." To
the contrary, Haxforth says that, "negligence
in committing an unlawful act" is culpable
negligence. Id. (emphasis added).
Having concluded that Idaho law requires a
culpable mental state of at least simple
negligence before an individual may be
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, we
must determine whether the criminal
complaint and the jury insh-uctions in
McNair's case adequately addressed this
element of the offense.

FN6. Because we conclude that LC.
4 6 18-201 and 18-4012 together
require a culpable mental state of at
least negligence, we need not address
McNair's argument that such a
requirement is mandated by the
constitutional guarantee of due
process.

B. The Criminal Complaint Was Not
Jurisdictionally Defective
McNair contends that the criminal
complaint was insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court because it did not
allege that his failure to maintain his lane of
travel was the product of a negligent act or
omission and, hence, did not allege all of the
elements of vehicular manslaughter. The
State contends that because the charge was a
misdemeanor, it was not necessary to allege
the specific facts of the offense. Without
reaching the State's contention, we conclude
that the complaint was not jurisdictionally
defective.
The second amended complaint identified at
least three alternative unlawful acts which
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allegedly were committed by McNair and
caused the death of the victim: (1) driving
"ccarlessly, imprudently or inattentively"
and/or (2) driving "at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the
conditions" and/or (3) "sliding his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane."
McNair does not challenge the sufficiency
of the allegations with respect to the first
two of these but contends that, because the
acts are pleaded in the alternative, the
omission of any allegation of negligence
with respect to the third act of sliding into
the oncoming lane makes the complaint
insufficient to allege an offense and, hence,
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court.

**415 268171r81 A charging document will
be deemed so flawed that it fails to confer
jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged
are not made criminal by statute or if the
document fails to state facts essential to
establish the offense charged. State v.
Maver, 139 Idaho 643. 646, 84 P.3d 579.
582 (Ct.Apu.2004); State v. Bvinpton, 135
Idaho 621, 21 P.3d 943 (Ct.Auu.2001). If
an alleged deficiency is raised by a
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty
plea, the charging document must state all
facts essential to establish the charged
offense, State v. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho
165, 168, 75 P.3d 219. 222 (Ct.Apu.2003);
Bvinpton, 135 Idaho at 623. 21 P.3d at 945;
but if the information is not challenged until
after a verdict or guilty plea, "it will be
liberally construed in favor of validity, and a
technical deficiency that does not prejudice
the defendant will not vrovide a basis to set
the conviction aside." Halbesleben. 139
Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222:
State v.
Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399,400,775 P.2d 1241,
1242 (1989); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho
285, 287, 805 P.2d 491. 493 (Ct.Auu.1991).
Thus, if the challenge is tardy, the charging

document will be upheld on appeal "unless
it is so defective that it does not, by any fair
or reasonable construction, charge an
offense for which the defendant was
convicted." Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at 168,
75 P.3d at 222. See also Robran. 119 Idaho
at 287.805 P.2d at 493.
Because the liberality we use in construing
the complaint depends upon the timing of
McNair's claim that it was jurisdictionally
defective, it is necessary to review the
relevant procedural history. The State's
original complaint was amended, and the
first amended complaint charged that on the
date in question McNair "did, unlawfully
but without malice kill Reed Elvin
Ostermeier, a human being, by operating a
motor vehicle ... in the commission of an
unlawful act or acts, not amounting to a
felony, without gross negligence, wherein,
his vehicle went into the oncoming lane of
traffic and struck the [Ostermeier]
vehicle...." Shortly afterward, McNair
moved to dismiss this amended complaint,
contending that the conduct alleged to have
constituted the underlying "unlawful act"
was consistent with lawful operation of a
motor vehicle. The State then filed the
second amended complaint that we have
heretofore quoted. The court minutes from
the hearing on the motion to dismiss show
that defense counsel told the court that he
was satisfied that the second amended
complaint resolved the objections raised in
the motion, and the magistrate therefore
found the motion to dismiss to be moot.
Now, following McNair's conviction, he
contends for the first time that the second
amended complaint was jurisdictionally
defective.
We therefore exercise
"considerable leeway to imply the necessary
allegations," Robran. 119 Idaho at 287, 805
P.2d at 493, and will find the pleading
insufficient to confer jurisdiction only if it
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does not "by any fair or reasonable
construction, charge the offense for which
the defendant was convicted." Halbesleben.
139 Idaho at 168.75 P.3d at 222.
McNair points out that, "sliding his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane" is
alleged as an independent, alternative
unlawful act upon which he could be
convicted for vehicular manslaughter. He
argues that because the phrase did not
include an allegation that he was negligent,
this alternate theory of criminal liability was
invalid, and that the entire complaint was
therefore insufficient to allege the offense.
Having concluded above that a culpable
mental state of at least negligence is
required under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c), we
agree with McNair that the third alternative,
"and/or sliding his vehicle into the
oncoming northbound lane," was defective
for failure to allege any negligence or other
culpable mental state. It does not follow,
however, that the amended complaint is
jurisdictionally insufficient merely because
the third alternative is infirm. Both the first
and second alternatives made clear
references to negligence, by using such
words and phrases as, "carelessly,"
"imprudently," "inattentively," "not paying
attention," and "at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the
FN7
McNair does not
conditions." cballenge*269 **416 the sufficiency of the
first and second alternatives. Because the
first two alternatives were sufficient to
describe an offense, we conclude that the
second amended complaint as a whole was
adequate to confer jurisdiction on the court.

FN7. The first alternative was
apparently refemng to inattentive
driving, LC. 6 49-1401(3), as the

underlying unlawful act and the
second alternative was apparently
refemng to a violation of Idaho's
basic speed rule, LC. 6 49-654(1).
C. Jury Instructions

J
'
9
JWe next address McNair's contention
that the jury instructions were erroneous
because they did not require a finding that
McNair was negligent before he could be
found guilty of vehicular manslaughter
under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c).
[loll1 11r121 When
reviewing jury
instructions, we ask whether the instructions
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law. State v.
Alsanea. 138 Idaho 733. 743. 69 P.3d 153.
163 (Ct.Apv.2003); State v. Bowman, 124
Idaho 936. 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199
[Ct.Avp.1993). A trial court must charge
the jury with all rules of law material to the
determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. LC. 6 19-21321a); State v.
Fetterlv, 126 Idaho 475, 476. 886 P.2d 780,
Therefore, the jury
781 (Ct.Avv.1994).
must be instructed on all elements of the
charged offense. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at
168-69, 75 P.3d at 222-23: State v. Crowe,
135 Idaho 43, 47. 13 P.3d 1256. 1260
(Ct.Apv.2000). The omission of an element
of the crime impermissibly lightens the
prosecution's burden of proof. Id.
McNair contends that Instruction 3 required
the jury to convict him even if it found that
he was not negligent during the events
leading up to the collision. That instruction
said:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of
Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1. On or about February 9,2001
2. in the state of Idaho
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3. the defendant Hugh S. NcNair, while
operating a motor vehicle committed one or
more of the following acts;
(a) Inattentive driving; and/or
(b) Operating his motor vehicle in violation
of Idaho's Basis Rule; and/or
(c) Failing to maintain lane of travel.
4. the defendant's operation of the motor
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Reed Ostermeier:
You are further instructed that the unlawful
act or acts are committed when one or all of
the following occurred:
(a) The defendant drove his vehicle
inattentively, carelessly or imprudently, in
light of the circumstances then existing;
andlor
(b) The defendant drove his motor vehicle in
violation of Idaho's Basic Rule by driving at
a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing or by failing to drive at a safe
and appropriate speed when approaching
and going around a curve or by reason of
weather or highway conditions; and/or
(c) The defendant, while driving his motor
vehicle, failed to maintain his lane of travel.
If the state has failed to prove paragraphs 1
through 4, then you must find the defendant
not guilty. If you unanimously find that the
state has proven paragraphs 1 through 4,
including at least one of the components of
the unlawful act or acts as stated in 3(a) or
@) or (c) beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty of
vehicular manslaughter.
This instruction, argues McNair, directed the
jury to convict him based solely upon his
failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if
such failure was not a product of negligence.
We agree. Application of parts 3(c) and
4(c) of the instruction required the jury to
find McNair guilty if the collision was

caused by McNair's failure to maintain his
lane of travel, irrespective of negligence or
other fault.
The State contends that any deficiency in
Instruction 3 was cured by Instruction 3A,
which was based upon LC. 6 18-201(3), and
which stated:
All persons are capable of committing
crimes, except those belonging to the
following classes:

....

**417 "270 3. Persons who committed the
act or made the omission charged, through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears
that there was not evil design, intention or
culpable negligence.
We are not persuaded that this instruction
cured the flaw in Instruction 3. The two
instructions may well have led to jury
confusion because they contradicted one
another. Instruction 3 told the jurors that if
they found McNair caused the victim's death
by failing to maintain his lane of travel
while driving, they "must find the defendant
guilty
of
vehicular
manslaughter."
Instruction 3A, on the other hand, implied
that McNair would not be guilty if he was
not negligent. A juror who believed the
defense theory, that McNair's vehicle left the
lane of travel but that it was not due to any
negligence on McNair's part, would be hardpressed to determine what effect to give to
Instruction 3A when Instruction 3 required a
guilty verdict.

1131 The instructions did not preclude the
jury from finding McNair guilty without any
finding of negligence or other culpability.
When it is not possible to determine whether
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court
must vacate the conviction and remand the
case for a new trial. State v. Luke. 134
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Idaho 294,301, 1 P.3d 795,802 (2000).

CONCLUSION
The second amended complaint in this case
was sufficient to allege an offense on two of
the three legal theories alleged, and it
therefore was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court. However, the jury
instructions were deficient because they did
not require the State to prove a culpable
mental state amounting to at least simple
negligence.
Therefore, the judgment of
conviction is vacated and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem
BEVAN concur.
Idaho App.,2005.
State v. McNair
141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d410
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